JPRS 83197

5 April 1983

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1755

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No. 12, December 1982

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PERFECTING LEADERSHIP OF PARTISAN MOVEMENT REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 26 Nov 82) pp 22-27

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Maj Gen V. Andrianov under the heading "Soviet Art of War in the Great Patriotic War": "Improving Strategic and Operational Leadership of the Partisan Movement"]

[Text] From the very first days of the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, the Communist Party devoted great attention to developing a partisan struggle on the temporarily enemy-occupied territory of the nation. Due to the party's efforts, this struggle reached a vast scope and became an important strategic and military-political factor in ensuring victory over the enemy.

At the outset of the war, there were no special bodies for leading the partisan movement (with the exception of the Karelo-Finnish republic and Leningrad Oblast partisan movement staffs). The combat activities of the partisans on the spot were directed by the republic and oblast party bodies as well as by the military councils of the fronts and armies. Overall, military-strategic leadership over the combat activities of the partisans was carried out by Headquarters Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] on the basis of the instructions of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee.

The insufficient elaboration on the eve of the war of a theory for strategic and operational use of partisan forms of combat and the absence of experience and control bodies for the partisan forces at first did not make it possible to effectively coordinate the partisan actions with the combat operations of the Soviet Army. Many partisan detachments were small in size and poorly armed and their personnel was little trained in military terms. The detachments lacked experienced commanders and political workers, scouts, radio operators and demolition experts. The partisan formations, as a rule, did not have dependable technical communications between themselves and with the unoccupied territory and this impeded the possibility of giving them tasks in the interests of the operations being carried out by the Soviet troops.

The first attempts at planning the partisan combat operations on an operational scale and the organizing of their cooperation with the troops of the Soviet Army occurred in the campaigns of 1941-1942. Thus, in November 1941, the staff of the Northwestern Front worked out a "Operational Plan for Hunter and Partisan Detachments to Defeat the Enemy Rear Services and Assist the Troops of the Front Advancing on Individual

Sectors in the Period from 21 through 31 December 1941."[1] In the spring of 1942, the staff of the Kalinin Front prepared a "Plan of Measures for Reducing Enemy Maneuverability and for Creating Difficulties for It in Delivering and Evacuating in the Period of the Spring Muddy Season (15 April-15 May 1942)."[2]

Instructive examples of cooperation by the Soviet troops and the partisans occurred in the offensive of the Western Front troops in January-March 1942 on the Vyazma axis. Thus, on 17 January 1942, on the territory of Znamenskiy Rayon of Smolensk Oblast, the partisans, upon the instructions of the underground party raykom, liberated 40 villages and hamlets. On the next day, subunits of the Soviet Army were landed in this rayon and together with these the partisans attacked the enemy garrison, having liberated 62 population points from the Nazis.[3]

In the course of the operations, during the first period of the war, cooperation between the partisans and the Soviet Army troops gradually was improved and perfected both on the operational and tactical scale, however, as a whole this still had a relatively limited scope and a sporadic nature.

In line with the further increased scope of the partisan movement and the necessity of more closely coordinating the combat activities of the partisans and the organizing of their cooperation with the Soviet Army troops, the need arose to set up special bodies for leading the partisan movement. By a decree of the GKO [State Defense Committee] of 30 May 1942, under Hq SHC a Central Staff for the Partisan Movement [TsShPD] was organized. For direct leadership over the partisan detachments, under the military councils of the fronts, this decree organized the Ukrainian (under the military council of the Northwestern Sector), Bryansk, Western, Kalinin, Leningrad and Karelo-Finnish (under the military council of the Karelian Front) staffs of the partisan movement and these were made subordinate to the TsShPD. The previously existing Karelo-Finnish and Leningrad ShPD [Staff of the Partisan Movement] were transformed into the staffs for the partisan movement of the fronts.

The member of the VKP(b) Central Committee and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party (Bolshevik), P. K. Ponomarenko, was appointed the chief of the TsShPD. The staffs of the partisan movement under the military councils of the fronts were headed, respectively, by T. A. Strokach, A. P. Matveyev, S. S. Bel'chenko, V. V. Radchenko, M. N. Nikitin and S. Ya. Vershinin.

The experience of the front ShPD soon showed that in directing the partisan movement it was essential to consider not only the zones of operations of the fronts, but also the Soviet administrative dividing of the occupied territory. For this reason, the front-level ShPD (with the exception of the Leningrad) were transformed into agencies of the TsShPD under the fronts (by the Decree of the GKO of 28 September 1942). Their leaders were made a member of the military councils of the fronts. But for directing the partisan struggle on the territory of the Union Republics, republic ShPD were set up as follows: the Ukrainian (29 June), Belorussian (9 September) and later the Lithuanian and Estonian. Under the military council of the Northern Caucasus Front on 3 August the southern ShPD was organized and in October the Moldavian section of the partisan movement under the Ukrainian ShPD. In the aim of strengthening the leadership over the struggle of the Soviet people in the enemy rear, the position of commander-in-chief of the partisan movement was established. The TsShPD was subordinate to him (the GKO Decree of 6 September 1942). The member of the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee

and member of the GKO and Hq SHC, Mar SU K. Ye. Voroshilov was appointed to this position.[4]

The measures carried out in 1942 significantly improved military and party leadership over the struggle of the Soviet people in the enemy rear and contributed to its further strengthening.

In the course of the war, the Central, Republic and Oblast ShPD has to carry out a large range of functional duties, the basic ones being: the organizing of the partisan formations and their organizational strengthening; the establishing of contact with the partisan combat detachments and underground groups set up upon the initiative of the local party organizations; the planning of basic combat operations conducted by large groupings of partisan forces and the organizing of cooperation between them; overall leadership over the combat activities of the partisans and the underground on the occupied territory of the nation, republic or oblast and direct leadership over the most important operations; the organizing of logistical support for the partisans from the unoccupied territory; the training of reserves, command personnel and specialists; the organizing of reconnaissance; the generalizing of the experience in the partisan struggle and the introduction of the most effective means and methods of combat activity; leadership and control over the work of the subordinate staffs (agencies, operational groups under the front-level military councils) and the providing of practical aid for them. One of the central tasks of the ShPD was to provide close cooperation between the partisan formations and the Soviet troops.

Since the main role in the armed struggle against the Nazi invaders was given over to the regular troops, the operations of the partisans were subordinate primarily to the interests of the Soviet Army and on this basis cooperation between the partisan forces and the Soviet troops was organized. Because of this the tendency to bring the leadership bodies of the partisan movement closer to the military leadership became evermore apparent. This was expressed primarily in the creating of agencies (operations groups) of the ShPD under the military councils of the fronts and armies as well as in broadening the staffing of the partisan staffs with military specialists and coordinating the activities of the leadership bodies of the partisan forces with the front's command.

The basic functions for the agencies of the ShPD under the front's military councils were the following: to acquaint the military command with the situation in the enemy rear and provide prompt information on all its changes as well as on the state of the partisan struggle in the specific operational sector; to provide aid to the command of the regular troops in using the partisan forces for carrying out combat and reconnaissance tasks; to organize cooperation of the partisans with the Soviet troops; to coordinate with the command of the fronts and armies questions of planning and leading the combat activities of the partisans, their logistical support and so forth.

The essence of centralizing leadership over partisan combat activities came down to subordinating the actions of all the partisan formations in the given strategic or operational sector to a common goal and to ensure the possibility of effectively setting tasks for each partisan grouping in the interests of the pending operations of the Soviet troops.

The centralizing of leadership over partisan combat operations at the same time did not exclude initiative from below, that is, from the partisan formations which often independently, proceeding from the specific situational conditions, determined the objects

for actions in the enemy rear and the methods for carrying out the missions on a tactical scale.

The creation of the partisan movement staffs with precise functions, the acquiring of experience by them and the improved contact with the partisan formations--all of this helped to improve the planning of partisan combat operations, it made it possible to focus their efforts at the necessary time on certain objectives and sectors, it ensured ever-greater coordination of actions by the large partisan groupings and improved their cooperation with the Soviet troops.

At the end of August and the beginning of September 1942, the TsShPD, upon instructions of the VKP(b) Central Committee, in Moscow held conferences for the representatives of the underground party bodies and the commanders and commissars of the large partisan formations of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Orel and Smolensk Oblasts. Participating in the work of the conferences were members of the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the leaders of the Central Committee system, the People's Commissariat of Defense and many prominent party leaders from these areas. The conferences generalized the experience of the partisan struggle and outlined the basic areas for partisan operations in accord with the strategic plans of the Supreme High Command.

The Order of the People's Commissar of Defense I. V. Stalin, "On the Tasks of the Partisan Movement" published on 5 September 1942 set out the main military-political task of the struggle in the enemy rear as defined by the VKP(b) Central Committee, that is, to turn the partisan movement into one of all the people, and the urgent need was emphasized of close coordination between the partisans and the Soviet Army.[5]

A turning point in the leadership of the partisan movement occurred in the second period of the war. The setting up of the ShPD, the acquiring of experience by them in leading significant partisan forces, the providing of a majority of the partisan formations with dependable radio communications,[6] and the improved supply of the essential materiel for them made it possible for Hq SHC to give the partisans more complex combat tasks and to coordinate their operations in the interests of the Soviet Army on an operational and strategic scale. Precisely in this period, particularly from the spring of 1943, they began systematically to work out plans for the operational-strategic utilization of the partisan formations both over extended periods of time as well as in the interests of the specific operations of the Soviet troops.

Thus, in July 1943, upon instructions of Hq SHC, the TsShPD, worked out a plan for a major operation to knock out the enemy rail lines (the "Rail War") and this envisaged the involvement of partisans from Belorussia, Leningrad, Kalinin, Smolensk and Orel Oblasts. The conducting of the operation was closely coordinated with the plans of Headquarters to complete the defeat of the enemy troops in the area of the Kursk Salient and to undertake a general offensive on the Soviet-German Front. The upsetting of the operation of the enemy communications over such a large expanse (around 1,000 km along the front and up to 750 km in depth) significantly impeded the enemy from regrouping its troops and to supply them with materiel.

During the moving up of the Soviet troops to the Dnepr, the Ukrainian ShPD[7] worked out a "Plan for Seizure by Partisan Detachments of the Crossings over the Dnepr and Desna Rivers and Assisting the Red Army in Capturing Kiev."[8] In carrying this out, the partisans of Kiev, Zhitomir, Rovno, Kamenets-Podolskiy and Volyn Oblasts initiated

mass sabotage operations on the railroads leading from the west to Kiev, Kremenchug and Dnepropetrovsk. The partisan units and formations operating in the zone of the front captured and prepared 25 crossings over the Dnepr, Dnesa and Pripyat Rivers for the Soviet Army units.[9]

When the Soviet Army troops initiated an offensive on the southwestern and western strategic sectors, the staff of the Northwestern Front, together with the Leningrad ShPD [LShPD] in September 1943 worked out the "Plan of Operations for the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th and 6th Partisan Brigades relating to the shifting of enemy troops from the Leningrad, Volkhov and Northwestern Fronts to other sectors and for the event of the going over of the front's troops to an offensive in the aim of pursuing the enemy with the start of its pullback to the west."[10]

In order to impede the enemy from maneuvering from one strategic sector to another, the TsShPD planned and carried out the Operation Concert upon the instructions of Hq SHC in the autumn of the same year. This operation was the second stage of the "Rail War."

Thus, a new important step ahead was taken in directing the combat activities of the partisans in 1943. Larger groups of partisans were involved in carrying out the tasks and at a significantly greater distance behind the front line than in the first period of the war. This marked the beginning to working out large partisan operations conducted simultaneously in the zone of several fronts.

By the GKO Decree of 18 January 1944, the TsShPD was abolished.[11] Leadership over the nationwide struggle in the enemy rear was entrusted fully to the central committees of the Union republic communist parties, to the oblast party committees and their subordinate staffs of the partisan movement. The military councils of the fronts were made responsible for providing the partisan detachments with aid in ammunition and explosives through the ShPD.[12]

It must be pointed out that by the start of 1944, the central committees of the Union republic communist parties, the obkoms, the republic and oblast ShPD had acquired great experience in leading the partisan movement and the underground activities. They had close ties with the military councils of the fronts and with the partisan formations. The capabilities of the fronts to supply the partisans with ammunition and food had increased significantly. This created favorable conditions for better coordinating the combat operations of the partisan formations and for organizing their cooperation with the Soviet Army troops.

Hq SHC and the command of the fronts and armies endeavored to utilize the combat capabilities of the partisans as effectively as possible in the interests of the offensive operations carried out. They began to inform the ShPD ahead of time about the pending operations, to determine the basic tasks for them and to provide greater help. This made it possible for the ShPD to promptly work out operational plans for the partisans and more closely organize cooperation with the troops of the fronts and armies.

In 1944, the staffs of the fronts and armies took an active part in planning partisan combat activities. Thus, on the eve of the offensive by the Soviet troops at Leningrad and Novgorod, the staff of the Leningrad Front issued instructions to the LShPD to increase combat and reconnaissance activities and set tasks for the partisans proceeding

from the overall plan of the operation. On the basis of these instructions, the LShPD worked out a detailed "Operational Plan for Combat Activities of Leningrad Partisans in the Enemy Rear in Cooperation with the Advancing Troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts."[13] The plan was coordinated with the operations sections of the front staffs and approved by the front commanders.[14]

In preparing for the Mogilev Operation, the intelligence section of the staff of the Second Belorussian Front elaborated a "Reconnaissance Plan for Partisan Formations and Detachments in the Enemy Rear for the Period from 26 May through 30 June 1944." It laid out in detail the tasks for each formation and indicated the methods for fulfilling them.[15] In Operation Bagration, a large grouping of Belorussian partisans consisting of 150 brigades and 49 individual detachments (almost 150,000 partisans),[16] in essence was a fifth cooperating front the efforts of which together with the troops of the First, Second and Third Belorussian and First Baltic Fronts were aimed at achieving a single goal.

With the approach of the Soviet Army to the western frontiers of the USSR, a need arose to coordinate the operations of the Soviet troops with the actions of not only Soviet, but also foreign partisan forces. In the spring of 1944, the central committees of the communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, with the agreement of the VKP(b) Central Committee, sent their representatives to the Ukrainian ShPD.[17] In April 1944, a Polish staff of the partisan movement (PShPD) was organized on Soviet territory. The Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR GKO on 3 April adopted a decision to turn over all the Polish partisan formations (nine detachments) organized and operating on Soviet territory to the PShPD and to supply it with weapons, equipment and ammunition. In the summer of 1944, raids by scores of Soviet partisan detachments were made on Polish and Czechoslovak territory.

The command of the fronts and the ShPD at this time began to plan combat operations predominantly for those partisan formations which had been moved abroad or had been founded on the basis of organized groups dropped into the enemy rear upon the request of representatives from the fraternal parties. The actions of the local partisan forces abroad were coordinated by the corresponding bodies of these parties, as a rule, in seeking approval for them from the Soviet command.

Thus, strategic and operational leadership over the partisan movement during the years of the Great Patriotic War was constantly improved. There was an on-going search for ways to most effectively lead the nationwide struggle in the enemy rear. This was reflected in a development in the forms of leadership over partisan combat activities, in improving the planning and logistical support for the operations conducted by them, in increasing the scope and raising the results of partisan combat operations and in directing their efforts to provide maximum aid to the Soviet Army.

Flexible, centralized leadership over partisan combat activities by the Soviet command significantly enriched the theory and practice of the partisan struggle.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 221, inv. 3928, file 11, sheets 1-28.

2. Ibid., folio 213, inv. 2002, file 333, sheets 15-21.

3. Smolensk Oblast Party Archives. Minutes of Sessions of VKP(b) Obkom Bureau for 1942, sheet 21.

4. In November 1942, this position was abolished. The TsShPD was again put under Hq SHC.

5. "Istoriya votoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 5, Voyanizdat, 1975, p 288.

6. In November 1943, 93 percent of the partisan detachments had radio contact with the bodies directing the partisan struggle (TsPA IML pri TsK KPSS [Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee], folio 61, inv. 1, file 784, sheet 4).

7. In April 1943, the Ukrainian ShPD was removed from direct subordination to the TsShPD. It was put directly under the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik) and Hq SHC and its agencies on the spot coordinated its work with the military councils of the fronts.

8. PA IIP pri TsK KP Ukrainy [Party Archives of the Party History Institute under the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party], folio 62, inv. 1, stor. unit 1, sheet 85.

9. Ibid., sheets 86-93.

10. TsAMO, folio 221, inv. 7834, file 18, sheets 1-4.

11. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," Vol 8, Voyenizdat, 1977, p 160.

12. TsAMO, folio 240, inv. 15789, file 11, sheet 118.

13. Party Archives of Leningrad Oblast, folio 0—116, inv. 1 file 222, sheets 1-2; file 275, sheet 8.

14. Ibid., inv. 1, file 275, sheets 6-8, 11.

15. TsAMO, folio 237, inv. 2400, file 5, sheets 17-21.

16. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," Vol 9, 1977, p 222.

17. PA IIP pri TsK KP Ukrainy, folio 62, inv. 1, stor. unit 1, sheet 111.

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WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN TOPOGRAPHIC SUPPORT REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 26 Nov 82) pp 28-33

[Article by Professor, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Maj Gen N. Voronkov and Candidate of Technical Sciences, Docent Col (Ret) N. Zakuvayev: "Topogeodetic Support for Troops"]

[Text] Topogeodetic support for troop combat operations includes a range of measures aimed at obtaining, processing and providing data to the commanders and staffs on the terrain as essential for studying and evaluating the terrain in preparing for and conducting an operation (engagement), for troop control and for efficient use of the weapons and combat equipment.

According to the prewar views, the main tasks in topogeodetic support for the troops were considered to be the early creation of topographic maps for the territory of the probable theaters of war, the stockpiling of these in the district and army stores and issuing them to the troops; the development of the state and special geodetic networks or data, the calculating of coordinates for geodetic points and the providing of these to the artillery units; the creation and issuing to the staffs and troops of special maps and photographic documents on the terrain.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War the topogeodetic support for the troops was organized by the staffs of the fronts and the armies and carried out by the bodies and units of the Military Topographic Service (VTS). The organizational-technical leadership and control over the state of topogeodetic support of the troops was entrusted to the Military Topographic Directorate (VTU) of the General Staff. This also organized cooperation of the VTS with the Aerial Photographic Service of the Air Forces and the Reconnaissance Section of the Artillery Staff of the Soviet Army. In preparing and conducting defensive and offensive strategic operations, the General Staff VTU coordinated the activities of the topographic services of the fronts.

From September 1942, the topographic service of the fronts was brought into conformity with the needs of combat practice. The staff of a front had a topographic section while an army staff had a topographic department (from June 1944, a section) while formations had topographers. [1]

The chief of the topographic section of the front's staff (he was also the chief of the front's topographic service) had at his disposal, as a rule, a motorized topographic

detachment (MTO) and a topographic or geodetic detachment, and one or two topographic map stores. The chief of the topographic section of an army staff had a store of topographic maps which organizationally was part of the section and a field printing plant. The topographers of the formations stored the maps in the staffs of the formations and the duplicating of very simple topographic and combat graphic documents was carried out on hectographs.

The content and scope of the work in carrying out tasks of topogeodetic support for operations were determined by the type of forthcoming combat operations, by the fighting strength and tasks of the troops, by the degree of cartographic and geodetic preparedness of the troop zone of operations, by their access to topogeodetic and cartographic materials, by the nature of the terrain, by the capabilities of the topographic service and by the available time. The influence of these factors in a specific combat situation varied and for this reason topogeodetic support for each operation had its particular features.

The supply of topographic maps for the troops. At the outset of the war, in line with the forced temporary retreat of the Soviet Army troops deep into their territory, it was essential to immediately prepare maps for significant areas of the internal regions of the Soviet Union. For this reason, already in July 1941, the Military Topographic Service was confronted with the task of creating by the year's end a map with a scale of 1:100,000 for the regions of the European USSR up to the Volga inclusively.[2] This was to be promptly carried out by the units of the VTU together with the enterprises of the Main Administration of Geodesy and Cartography (GUGK). In the first quarter of 1942, maps with scales of 1:200,000 and 1:500,000 were prepared for these same regions.[3]

From the autumn of 1941, when the troops required maps with a scale of 1:50,000, these were manufactured by enlarging maps with a scale of 1:100,000 with the printing of additional information, chiefly on the tactically most important elements of the terrain, roads and road structures, hydrography, population points and so forth). These maps were called "enlarged maps" and served as the basis for compiling various special maps (reconnaissance, artillery and so forth).

Leadership over the issuing of topographic maps to the troops prior to the start of the war had been entrusted to the VTS which basically correctly carried out the task of creating the necessary supplies of topographic maps in the district and then the front and army stores. Thus, in the Battle of Moscow, by the start of the counteroffensive the front stores had a significant quantity of maps of all scales. The entire supply of maps created on the Western Front was located at two stores: at a rear one which set up a mobile department and the basic (head) one located near the topographic section of the front's staff.

Subsequently, in the course of the counteroffensive, when the rear bodies of the Western Front moved into new areas, a system of map supply was organized according to a scheme of: central base—rear front store—mobile department of rear store—basic (head) map store—army stores—troop formations. This was disrupted only in individual instances when it was essential to immediately make up supplies of the maps in the armies or issue them to formations and units which had newly arrived in the front from the High Command Reserve. In these instances, aircraft or transport of the formations and units themselves were employed to deliver the maps.

From the front stores of the Western Front in the course of combat operations around Moscow, around 16.5 million copies of maps were issued. Of these, 51 percent was maps with a scale of 1:100,000 and 30 percent with a scale of 1:50,000. On the Kalinin Front in this same period, 3.7 copies were issued and 11 million copies on the Southwestern Front.[4] Under the defensive conditions the expenditure of large-scale maps exceeded the established standards by 20-30 percent and this necessitated an increase in map supplies for individual nomenclature sheets.[5]

The topographic sections of the front staffs organized the printing up of the missing map sheets using the equipment of the subordinate map-publishing subunits which were part of the motorized topographic detachments, the military cartographic factories and civilian enterprises which were in the zone of the fronts. In August 1942, the VTS was equipped with a printing plant train which during the operation was made available to the front operating on the main sector for printing maps and other topographic documents.

In preparing for and particularly in conducting offensive operations in 1944, the work of supplying maps for the troops became more complex. This was carried out in the course of a series of successive offensive operations without substantial lulls in operations, and sometimes under the conditions of great muddiness and a significant disruption of the lines of communications. In order to reduce the time for delivering maps from the Center, intermediate map supplies were created at the stores of the military districts in the front zone. Thus, the supplementing of the front stores of the Ukrainian fronts from the stores of the Kiev Military District made it possible to cut the time for delivering maps to the troops in half.

The experience of employing maps in the 1944 offensive operations showed that a map with a scale of 1:50,000 was needed chiefly in breaking through the enemy defenses and in conducting combat operations to rout its surrounded groupings.[6] The basic map on an offensive was one with a scale of 1:100,000, particularly for the tank and mechanized troops. They began to utilize a map with a scale of 1:200,000 significantly more widely. For this reason, in the course of an offensive it was necessary to replenish the supplies of such maps for the front and army stores.

A significant portion of the front stores was comprised of obsolete maps. For this reason in preparing for the operations, the topographic service of the fronts gave great attention to correcting the maps. This was done as follows: on territory occupied by our troops--according to the data of a field survey along routes, and on territory occupied by the enemy--using aerial photographs. Initially maps with scales of 1:25,000 and 1:50,000 were corrected for the first defensive line of the enemy defenses in the sectors of the main thrusts of the fronts. Here the corrections were made in two or three colors and this significantly facilitated the use of the maps by the troops.

In the third period of the war, when the troops of the fronts were advancing rapidly and the railroads had been destroyed by the enemy, the mobile and basic stores and their departments were hundreds of kilometers behind, creating significant difficulties in map supply. In line with this at the command posts of the fronts they began to set up departments of the basic (head) store for supplying maps to the front command posts and in addition aviation was more widely employed to deliver maps to the front and army stores. Thus, in July 1944, aircraft delivered around 3 million copies of maps from the central store located in Moscow to the Second and Third Belorussian Fronts.

As a total in the Belorussian Operation, the four fronts received around 15 million copies of various scaled maps.[7]

In carrying out the Vistula-Oder and Berlin Operations, affiliates of the central map store were organized in direct proximity to the fronts and this significantly shortened the time for delivering maps to the front stores. The tank armies were issued maps for the entire width of the front's zone. Here the basic ones for them were maps with a scale of 1:100,000 and 1:200,000. The artillery and engineer units used maps with a scale of 1:50,000.

Supply of troops with geodetic data. At the outset of the war, under the conditions of the defensive engagements in the border zone and with the comparatively rapid retreat of our troops into the interior of the nation, the fixing of artillery firing positions was basically carried out using maps by the forces of the Artillery Topographic Service (ATS). In August-September 1941, the Soviet Army troops in the retreat were in areas for which there were no large-scale maps. For this reason the accuracy of preparing data using a map for firing from concealed firing positions was insufficient. The topographic service of the fronts was confronted with the task of creating special geodetic networks (SGS) on the major defensive lines as the basis for developing the artillery control networks.

The forces of the front topographic services provided special geodetic networks (SGS) in the regions of Novgorod and Bologoye (Northwestern Front), Yartsev and Yelnya (Western Front), Kiev, Krivoy Rog, Nikolayev (Southwestern and Southern Fronts) and the Mozhayk Defensive Line (Reserve Front). The density of the points was reduced to one point per 3-5 km^2. From these an artillery control network and the subsequent fixing of the artillery battle formations was carried out. However, frequently the SGN points were not employed as the artillery topographic service on many fronts required additional personnel and technical outfitting. For this reason during the period of the defensive engagements, the subunits of the front topographic detachments usually were at the disposal of the chiefs of the army topographic services where they carried out the assignments of the army artillery staff in fixing the artillery battle formations of the army and its formations.

In preparing for the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, the geodetic networks were condensed to a density of one point per 3-6 km^2 and close to the forward edge and in the dispositions of the artillery to one point per km^2. In the course of the offensive, as in the Battle of Moscow, the subunits (groups) of topographers (geodesists) were attached to the chiefs of the topographic service of the armies fighting in the main sectors and sometimes in operational terms were put under the artillery staffs of the armies (the Stalingrad Front).

In the course of the war, with an increase in the number of artillery, the amount of geodetic work also grew. Thus, the military council of the Voronezh Front in a special directive obliged the artillery staffs of the armies and the VTS bodies of the front to develop a network of control points in the artillery deployment areas with a density of five-six points per km^2, to prepare artillery fire only on a geodetic basis, to systematically monitor the accuracy of fixing the artillery positions and to improve the special preparations for the personnel in the subunits of the artillery topographic service. In carrying out this directive, the subunits of topographers and geodesists were assigned to the artillery staffs of the armies and these determined the dates, the area and sequence of geodetic work.

When the capabilities of the ATS had significantly grown, the topographic subunits of the VTS began to be involved in fixing the artillery battle formations only in individual instances. Thus, while in 1942-1943 the VTS units made up to 60 percent of all the fixings of the battle formations, at the start of 1945, their involvement in carrying out this task was just 15-20 percent. Cooperation between the untis of the VTS and ATS was improved. Here the topographic service of the fronts was entrusted with monitoring the accuracy of the fixings carried out by the ATS subunits and the troops themselves. This told positively on the capabilities of the front topographic services in developing the special geodetic networks.

As a result of carrying out a large amount of geodetic work, the artillery softening up in breaking through defensive enemy lines were carried out, as a rule, on a geodetic basis and this ensured very efficient artillery firing.

Supply of troops with special maps and photographic documents. In the course of the war, the commanders and staffs needed additional (to the topographic maps) terrain data needed in taking decisions, organizing cooperation and troop control and for more efficient use of the weapons and military equipment. The need arose of creating special maps and photographic documents including: maps for the passability of terrain, tank maps, artillery maps, maps (diagrams) of water barriers or maps of individual legs of rivers. Of primary importance were the intelligence maps (diagrams) made from materials of aerial photography as well as the road and coded maps.

The intelligence maps (diagrams) in the Battle of Moscow began to be drawn up in September 1941 using aerial reconnaissance materials of the Western Front. A group of topographic interpreters located at the photographic platoon of the reconnaissance air squadron (in the area of Vyazma) using aerial photographs detected data on the enemy and plotted these on a map with a scale of 1:50,000. These were reported to the front staff and then reproduced in 100-150 copies and issued to the staffs of the formations and units.

On the near approaches to Moscow in November-December 1941, the intelligence data were printed on blank single-color maps with a scale of 1:25,000 and issued to the staffs of the formations. For aviation air situation maps were compiled with a scale of 1:500,000 and the detected enemy airfields and antiaircraft weapons were shown on them.

In the Battle of Stalingrad, the topographic service of the Don Front prepared the largest number of diverse special maps. A photogrammetric group which included representatives of the aerial photographic service of the Air Forces and the VTS, every 2-4 days interpreted the aerial photographs and compiled intelligence diagrams with scales of 1:100,000 and 1:50,000. These were reproduced in 50-60 copies and issued to the army staffs.[8] The aerial photographs were also used for correcting and supplementing the maps and plans of cities which were strongpoints in the enemy defenses. Analogous work was carried out in preparing for the Battle of Kursk (1943) and the Belorussian Operation (1944).

In the Third Belorussian Front, a photogrammetric group which was directly under the chief of the topographic section of the front's staff prepared, in addition to intelligence diagrams, photographic surveys (photographic mosaics). These showed the interpreted objects in the enemy positions, the most important quantitative and qualitative

characteristics of the terrain relief and the plant cover and a coordinate grid was applied making it possible to obtain target coordinates. These photographic mosaics were the prototype of modern photographic maps. They were particularly indispensable in those instances when there were no large-scale maps of areas where essential terrain conditions had occurred as a result of the extended presence of troops. The aerial photographs completely disclosed the trenches, the communications trenches, the antitank pits and artillery batteries. Some 70-75 percent of the mortar batteries, pillboxes and dugouts were disclosed.

In preparing for and in the course of the Berlin Operation (1945), the topographic services of the fronts participating in it gave great attention to providing the troops with updated topographic maps and large-scale plans of cities, with maps for the river crossing sectors, relief maps and mock-ups of the terrain as well as intelligence and coded maps. For the First Belorussian Front, a portable mock-up of Berlin with a scale of 1:5,000 was made.

Thus, the topogeodetic support in the major operations of the Great Patriotic War was one of the basic types of all-round support for troop combat operations. This was carried out continuously during the entire war and helped to increase the effectiveness of considering and judging the impact of the terrain on the success of conducting the operation. It helped to improve the accuracy of artillery fire and ensured centralized control over this on the defensive and offensive.

The experience of the war showed that the topogeodetic preparation of probable theaters of war should be carried out chiefly in peacetime so that the troops always be supplied with topographic maps and have a developed system of geodetic points and catalogs of their coordinates.

The system established in the prewar years of centralized supply of maps for the troops through a network of front and army topographic map stores in the course of the war generally proved effective, but also required significant improvement. In all operations on all fronts, special maps and photographic documents were created in the aim of providing the staffs and commanders with additional information on the state of the terrain under specific physicogeographic conditions under which the operations were to be prepared for and carried out. These measures have assumed even greater importance under present-day conditions, particularly with the employment of weapons of mass destruction which cause enormous damage to the terrain. The troops must first of all have updated topographic maps and photographic documents. For this reason, it is essential to further improve the means and methods for obtaining and processing aerial photography materials used to obtain intelligence information and for updating maps and plans.

Also of greater significance are the initial geodetic data employed for the topogeodetic fixing of all types of missiles and artillery. Here the rapid obtaining of highly accurate geodetic data is of great significance.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sbornik materialov po izucheniyu opyta voyny" [Collection of Materials on Studying the Experience of the War], No 12, Voyenizdat, 1944, p 238.

2. IZVESTIYA VYSSHIKH UCHEBNYKH ZAVEDENIY, No 3, Moscow, 1975, p 6 (INFORMATSIONNO-TEKHNICHESKIY BYULLETEN'), No 4, Moscow, 1975, p 203).

3. "Sbornik materialov...," No 12, p 233.

4. V. I. Kazakov, "Topogeodezicheskoye obespecheniye operatsiy v pervom periode Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny (1941-1942 gg.)" [Topogeodetic Support of Operations in the First Period of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1942)], Moscow, Izd. Voyenno-inzhenernoy akademii imeni V. V. Kuybyshev, 1975, Izd. VPA, p 10.

5. "Sbornik materialov...," No 26, Voyenizdat, 1948, p 72.

6. GEODEZIYA I KARTOGRAFIYA, No 5, Moscow, Nedra, 1980, p 4.

7. "Sbornik materialov...," No 26, p 20.

8. Ibid., p 80.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: 'LITTLE SATURN' OPERATION AGAINST ITALIAN 8TH ARMY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 26 Nov 82) pp 34-40

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col Yu. Plotnikov and Candidate of Historical Sciences Lt Col (Res) V. Safronov under the heading "On the 40th Anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad": "The Rout of the Italian 8th Army in the 'Little Saturn' Operation (December 1942)"]

[Text] At the peak of the Battle of Stalingrad, the Nazi Command transferred the 8th Italian Army to the Army Group B. The commander of the group, Gen M. Weichs, decided to commit it to the engagement on the Middle Don between the 2d Hungarian and 3d Romanian Armies where it was to take up the defensive.

In order to thwart the attempts by the Nazi troops to relieve the grouping surrounded at Stalingrad, in December 1942, the Soviet Command prepared the Operation Little Saturn in the course of which the Soviet troops were to reach the flank and rear of the Manstein grouping. For this, Hq SHC resolved to make the main thrust on the right wing of the Southwestern Front by the forces of the 1st Guards Army and the left-flank 6th Army of the Voronezh Front from the Osetrovka staging area in a southeasterly direction toward Tasinskaya and Morozovsk. Then the II and XXXV Army Corps of the 8th Italian Army were to be routed and their troops and the Bokovskaya enemy grouping enveloped from the west. The second thrust in the Operation Little Saturn was to be made against the operational group Hallidt and the remnants of the 3d Romanian Army from an area to the north of Chernyshevskaya by forces of the 3d Guards Army of the Southwestern Front in the direction of Morozovsk with the task of enveloping the Bokovskaya grouping and the 8th Italian Army from the south.

The offensive from the Osetrovka staging area which hung over the basic forces of the 8th Italian Army and the Bokovskaya enemy grouping created advantageous conditions for coming out in the rear of the enemy defenses. Moreover, this disrupted the system of command and logistical support and ensured the subsequent complete rout of the enemy in cooperation with the troops of the 3d Guards Army. Here a further push to the line of Tatsinskaya, Morozovsk created a real threat to the relieving Manstein troop grouping. Proceeding from this the choice of the direction of the main thrust was set on the right wing of the Southwestern Front.



Combat Operations of Troops of Southwestern Front (December 1942)

By the start of the offensive, the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front and the troops of the Southwestern Front numbered 425,500 men, over 5,000 guns and mortars, more than 1,000 tanks and more than 300 combat aircraft. They were opposed by the basic forces of the 8th Italian Army, the operational group Hallidt and the remnants of the 3d Romanian Army (the left wing of the Army Group Don). These represented 459,000 men, more than 6,200 guns and mortars and 600 tanks. Some 500 aircraft were assigned to support the ground forces.[1] Thus, the Soviet troops surpassed the enemy only in terms of tanks and were inferior to it in personnel, artillery, mortars and combat aircraft. A characteristic feature of the operation was the bold concentration of men and equipment by the Soviet command on the selected areas for breaking through the

enemy defenses. Thus, the 6th Army which advanced in a 27-km zone deployed in the breakthrough sector of 9 km, four out of the five rifle divisions and one tank corps while the 1st Guards Army concentrated virtually all its forces (five rifle divisions and three tank corps) on a narrow 18-km sector, leaving just two rifle divisions on the remaining 127 km of the zone of operations. As a total, 142,000 soldiers and officers, 1,317 guns and mortars, 754 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts were concentrated on the 27-km breakthrough sector. [2]

The bold massing of men and equipment on the sector of the main thrust and the achieving of surprise show the high level of development in Soviet military art. This made it possible for the Soviet command to create double superiority over the enemy and in individual areas triple superiority, while the Nazi Command was fully confident that the Soviet troops had exhausted all their offensive capabilities in the course of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad and would not be capable in the near future of conducting major operations.

When the Soviet troops commenced their counteroffensive at Stalingrad, the Nazi Command had been forced to withdraw two infantry divisions and one tank division from the area of responsibility of the 8th Italian Army and this weakened its defenses. All of this subsequently provided reason for Italian historians to assert that the weak Italian divisions stretched in a thin thread along the Don and deprived of any reserves were unable to carry out the tasks that were incommensurable with their forces in providing a "rigid defense," as envisaged by the German Command. [3]

In actuality, the Italian Army in its zone for 6 weeks had been building a tactical defensive zone 6 and more km deep. Here they had created an extensive system of trenches, communications trenches and pillboxes. Strongpoints and centers of resistance comprised the basis of the defenses. The approaches to the strongpoints were well covered by various man-made barriers, particularly minefields and all types of fire. [4] The presence of rather effective field artillery (a significant portion of this was on mechanical traction), the very high mobility of the units and formations and the substantial superiority in aviation were strongpoints in the defenses of the 8th Italian Army. The defenses were weakened by the absence of previously prepared defensive lines in the operational depth. The corps and army reserves were insufficient and they lacked antitank weapons. One other substantial shortcoming was the imprecise troop command as a result of the "inter-Allied" friction and conflicts between the Germans and Italians.

Initially, the Soviet High Command planned to conduct Operation Saturn from 10 December in the aim of reaching Rostov-na-Donu in order to cut off the entire Caucasian grouping of Nazi troops.

Two days prior to the start of the general offensive, they planned to conduct reconnaissance in force using the forward battalions. But as a consequence of the unpreparedness of the troops for the forthcoming operations, upon the request of the representative of Headquarters, Gen N. N. Voronov, the date for the start of the operation was moved back to 13-14 December. [5] In line with this reconnaissance in force was commenced on 11 December by two battalions in the zone of advance of the 11th Guards Army of the Southwestern Front [6] and on 12 December by three battalions in the breakthrough area of the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front. [7]

On 12 December, the Nazi troops began an offensive from the area of Kotel'nikovo in the aim of relieving the encircled 6th Army of von Paulus. The main thrust was made by the strong Goth Group which succeeded in piercing the defenses of the weakened 51st Army of the Stalingrad Front.

The change in the situation on the Stalingrad sector necessitated the making of immediate adjustments in the plan to conduct the operation on the Middle Don. Now the aim of the operation was to thwart the enemy's attempt to relieve the von Paulus troops encircled at Stalingrad. The Soviet troops were to make the main thrust not on the southern sector, but rather the southeastern. The start of the offensive was moved back to 16 December.

From the start of the reconnaissance in force to the going over to the offensive by our troops, the enemy carried out a number of changes in its operational configuration. Thus, the 385th Infantry Division was shifted to the II Army Corps and on 15 December it replaced in the first echelon the Italian Cosseria Division which was moved to the second echelon.[8] The Revenna Division which was in the sector of the front's main thrust was given separate artillery and tank subunits. The 14th German Infantry Police Regiment was brought up from the rear to reinforce the left flank of the 385th Infantry Division. The 3d Mountain Rifle Division was also removed from the Alpine Corps of the 8th Italian Army to the II Army Corps. This division entered battle on 18 December. The 27th German Tank Division was moved up into the region of the Boguchar Valley. The 387th German Division received instructions to move to the positions of the 8th Italian Army.[9] The envisaged measures significantly strengthened the defenses of the Italian Army in the sector of the Soviet troop offensive. Thus, the thesis which has become widespread in foreign historiography, particularly Italian, on the extreme weakness of the Italian army's defensive positions, the complete lack of reserves and the poor equipping of its units and formations is far from conforming to reality.

On the morning of 16 December, a strong 90-minute artillery softening-up commenced, but the effectiveness of the artillery fire without air support (due to the thick fog the aviation could not operate during the first hours of the offensive) was low. As a result the enemy defenses were not sufficiently neutralized. When the rifle formations in the breakthrough sector went over to the offensive, they encountered organized resistance. In the first half of the day, at a price of great effort the rifle units were able to advance just 2-3 km. In this situation, the commanders of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts decided to commit the tank corps to the engagement for completing the breakthrough of the tactical defensive zone. But in attacking without a halt, their forward detachments suffered losses in the enemy minefields and were forced to break off the attack. The clearing of passages through the minefields delayed the committing of the main forces of the tank formations to the engagement until the morning of the following day.

In the second half of 16 December, the weather improved somewhat. The artillery and aviation of the fronts strengthened the support for the advancing troops.[10] Under the cover of artillery fire, the rifle units resumed the offensive. Success was achieved in the area of the 195th Rifle Division which was advancing in the boundary area between the 318th German Infantry Regiment and the Italian Ravenna Division. This forced the Italians to utilize the second echelon in the form of the Cosseria Division to close the breach which had formed.[11]

In the morning of 17 December, the formations of the 6th and 1st Guards Armies resumed the offensive. On the same day, the XXV and XVIII Tank Corps were committed to battle and later the XVII and XXIV. This provided an opportunity by the end of the day, with active air support, to complete the breakthrough of the enemy tactical defensive zone and advance 20-25 km. The units and subunits of the 318th German Infantry Regiment and the Italian Ravenna and Cosseria Infantry Divisions were routed.

The German-Italian Command endeavored to organize resistance deep in the defenses on the line of the Boguchar River. By 18 December, it had succeeded in bringing up fresh reserves in the form of the 3d Mountain Rifle Italian Division from the Alpine Corps and units of the 387th German Division. Along with the 27th Tank Division which comprised the army reserve, they advanced to the Boguchar River to close the breach which had formed as a result of the defeat of the II Italian Corps. The newly arrived formations and the remains of the German units from the II Army Corps were incorporated in the XXIV German Tank Corps.

The tank corps which were advancing on the right flank and in the center of the assault grouping of the 1st Guards Army in the second half of the day crossed the Boguchar River and, in breaking out into the clear, by the end of the day with their forward subunits had reached the line of Setrakovskiy, Aleksayevo-Lozovskoye.

The 6th Army of the Voronezh Front on 18 December successfully carried out the set task of effective support for the right flank of the assault grouping of the Southwestern Front and its XVII Tank Corps having rushed forward, was pushing to the large enemy railroad station and center of resistance, Kantemirovka.

As a result of the 3-day battles, the troops of the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts succeeded in crushing the enemy defenses. In the zone of the 6th and 1st Guards Armies, the breakthrough had been widened to 60 km along the front and up to 40 km in depth.[12]

The 3d Guards Army of the Southwestern Front, in attacking the German-Romanian Hallidt Group, by the end of 18 December, after committing the I Guards Mechanized Corps to battle, had advanced up to 20 km in depth and had come out in the flank and rear of the 8th Italian Army. The organized resistance by the enemy ceased in the entire zone of advance. Pursuit of the enemy commenced. Columns of retreating enemy moved without any definite plan into areas where they encountered the least resistance.[13]

"If one were to insist on details," wrote the Italian historian Bocca, "on the holding of the defenses in individual areas and the heroism shown in this--this would mean to distort the story as a whole. But the truth of the story is that even on 18 December the complete defeat of the Italian troops had occurred....The Soviet tank units, like a knife through butter, had cut across the positions of our divisions and the defenses of the 8th Army collapsed."[14]

In the aim of improving troop command, Hq SHC on 19 December 1942, transferred the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front to the Southerwestern Front.[15] The commander of the latter, Gen N. F. Vatutin, demanded that the army commanders increase the rate of advance. The tank corps were given the task, without engaging in battles for the strongpoints, to advance into the rear of the enemy's main forces in sending forward advance detachments for cutting off the routes of retreat. The rate of advance began

to increase. By 24 December, the tank corps had fought their way up to 240 km. On this day, the XXV Tank Corps captured Yryupin and the XXIV Tank Corps took Tatsinskaya Station.

The actions of the XXIV Tank Corps (commander, Gen V. M. Badanov) in capturing Tatsinskaya Station is a vivid example of a deep raid in the enemy rear. As a result of bold and decisive actions, on 24 December its units, in catching the Nazis by surprise, broke through to Tatsinskaya and captured it. This made it possible for the Soviet tank troops to cut the sole Likhaya—Stalingrad main line over which prior to this the enemy had moved troops and supplied them with everything necessary. Food, artillery, clothing and other stores were captured and over 300 aircraft were captured and destroyed at the airfield and railroad station.

However, the Nazi Command of the Army Group Don succeeded in bringing up reserves (the 11th Tank Division) and to cut off the XXIV Corps from the remaining forces of the front. For 5 days, the tank corps held Tatsinskaya, in fighting while encircled, and then, in carrying out the order of the commander of the Southwestern Front, broke out of the ring of encirclement and linked up with the basic forces.[16]

The separated and jumbled remnants of the defeated formations of the 8th Italian Army in their hurried retreat moved back to the southwest and south. An important role in completing the rout of the enemy was played by the mobile detachments which were sent out from the rifle formations. In moving along the roads, they made surprise raids on the retreating enemy units, cutting off their route of escape, while the basic forces of the rifle formations completed the encirclement and crushed the resisting groupings.

The defeat of the 8th Italian Army and the left wing of the Group Don forced the Nazi Command to commence moving troops from other sectors of the front and from Europe in order to check the offensive of the Southwestern Front. Thus, from 18 through 29 December, the following movements were made: the 11th Tank Division from the region to the north of Tormosin, the 6th Tank Division from the 4th Army, the 19th Tank Division from the 9th Army, the 387th Infantry Division from the 2d Hungarian Army, the 8th Airfield Division from Poland, the 3d Mountain Rifle Division from the OKH Reserve, the 304th Infantry Division from the reserve of Army Group B and the 7th Tank Division from France. As a consequence of the stubborn resistance by the enemy reserves brought up from the rear, on 30 December, the front was stabilized on the line Novaya Kalitva, Markovka, Chertkovo, Voloshino, to the north of Millerovo, Ilinka, Skosyrskaya and Chernyshkovskiy.

The operation of the Soviet Army or the Middle Don was successfully concluded. The troops of the Southwestern Front and the left wing of the Voronezh Front dealt a new major defeat to the enemy and significantly broadened the scale of the counteroffensive commenced in the area of Stalingrad. In the course of the operation, the enemy defenses were pierced in a zone up to 340 km wide, the troops had advanced to a depth of 150-200 km and crushed the basic forces of the 8th Italian Army, the Operational Group Hallidt and the remains of the 3d Romanian Army, having destroyed a total of five Italian divisions and three brigades, crushed five Romanian divisions and one German division and causing losses to four German infantry divisions and two tank divisions.[17]

The total losses of the Italian Army, according to the official data of the Italian General Staff, from 11 December 1942 through 31 January 1943 on the Soviet-German Front

were 84,830 men killed, missing in action and taken prisoner and 29,690 wounded and frostbite victims. The Italian Army lost virtually all its weapons.[18]

The Nazi Command was forced to consume all the reserves destined for the offensive against Stalingrad to combat the advancing troops of the Southwestern Front and to give up further attempts to relieve the grouping surrounded at Stalingrad. This led to a decisive change in the situation on the Stalingrad-Rostov sector and played an important role in the final rout of the surrounded Nazi troops.

The defeat of the 8th Italian Army on the Soviet-German Front had great military-political consequences. It became one of the main factors accelerating the withdrawal of Fascist Italy from the war.

From the viewpoint of the development of Soviet military art, in the designated operation one can note the following characteristic traits. With an overall equality of forces on the entire front, by the start of the offensive the Soviet command had created decisive superiority in personnel and equipment in the sector of the main thrust. Regardless of the fact that the enemy was expecting our offensive, its strength and scope were completely unexpected for it. This was achieved due to keeping the operational plan of the fronts a secret. Particular attention should be paid to the organization of support for the advancing groupings of the Southwestern Front against possible enemy counterstrikes. The right-flank troops of the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front, having repelled all enemy attacks and holding firmly to the taken line, ensured that the formations of the 1st Guards Army would carry out the tasks set for them. The prompt transfer of the 6th Army of the Voronezh Front to the Southwestern Front by Hq SHC also played an important role in increasing the effectiveness of troop command.

The actions of the tank and mechanized corps had a great impact on the course and results of the operation. In operating a significant distance away from the main forces, they unexpectedly reached major enemy lines of communications and cut the escape routes of enemy troops, they disrupted control, communications and rear operations, in depriving the enemy of the possibility of organized resistance, and created conditions for the piecemeal destruction of the enemy troops.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 6, Voyenizdat, 1976, pp 66-67.

2. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 5, 1972, p 26.

3. F. Valori, "Gli Italiani in Russia," Milan, 1967, pp 270-271; Vittorio de Castiglioni, "Dal Dniester al Don," RIVISTA MILITARE, No 2, 1978, pp 74-81.

4. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," footnote 6, p 44.

5. TsAMO [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], inv. No 59/2570.

6. Ibid., folio 229, inv. 17650/ss, file 2, sheets 72, 73.

7. Ibid., inv. 590, file 38, sheets 94-96; inv. 2777, file 20, sheet 20.

8. "L'8 Armata Italiana nella seconda bataglia defensiva del Don," Rome, 1946, pp 17-19.

9. Ibid.

10. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," Vol 6, p 68.

11. F. Valori, op. cit., p 22.

12. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," Vol 6, p 69.

13. "L'8 Armata Italiana...," p 33.

14. G. Bocca, "Storia d'Italia nella guerra fascista 1940-1943."

15. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," Vol 6, p 69.

16. Ibid., pp 70-71.

17. Ibid., p 72.

18. "L'8 Armata Italiana...," p 71.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD AND 'FALSIFIERS' OF HISTORY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 26 Nov 82) pp 41-45

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences Col A. Yakushevskiy: "The Battle of Stalingrad and the Falsifiers of History"]

[Text] The Battle of Stalingrad ended with a complete victory for the Soviet Armed Forces. In the most stubborn defensive battles our troops were able to defend the city on the Volga and then deal the enemy a crushing blow. "In this battle," commented L. I. Brezhnev, "the Red Army showed heroism and military art which know no equals in the history of wars and sustained a brilliant victory.... The news of this victory by the Soviet troops spread throughout all occupied Europe. It penetrated the walls of the Nazi prisons and the barbed wire of the death camps. It instilled faith in the inevitable demise of fascism and called for resistance and struggle."[1]

Of all the battles which occurred on the Soviet-German Front, bourgeois historians have given and do give it the greatest attention. In the West, much literature devoted to the Battle of Stalingrad has been published. The estimates of it by bourgeois historians are contradictory. On the one hand, they cannot help but recognize the important role played by the battle in the course and outcome of the war and, on the other, endeavor in every possible way to play down the world historical significance of the victory of the USSR Armed Forces and belittle the accomplishments of Soviet military art.

In order to increase the prestige of their works, bourgeois historians have endeavored to present themselves to their readers as dispassionate observers and often speak about the courage of the Stalingrad defenders and praise the Soviet plan of the counteroffensive. However, here they also intentionally distort historical events.

In bourgeois historiography, the reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad are distorted with particular strength. Many researchers endeavor to prove their accidental nature and thereby do not recognize the validity of the Soviet Army's victory on the Volga. They write a great deal about the "mistakes of Hitler" and propose theses about the "Russian miracle," the "mysterious nature" of the Soviet people and the "specific traits" of the Russian people which, in the words of the English historian R. Seth, "are difficult to understand for a Western man."[2] The Australian author J. Jukes explains the successes of the Soviet Army on the Volga "by an element of luck."[3] Certain new explanations have also been offered. Thus, the former Wehrmacht Maj Gen F. Mellenthin in his book "German Generals of World War II" asserts that "the Battle

of Stalingrad...was not of any particular strategic significance" and was merely "a battle for prestige between Hitler and Stalin who had resolved that the city named after him should not fall into enemy hands."[4]

Mellenthin sees Hitler's main mistake in having the Nazi troops advance simultaneously against the Caucasus and Stalingrad instead of focusing basic efforts on the capture of the Caucasus. This, in the author's opinion, led to a "dissipation of forces" for the advancing troops and made it possible for the Soviet Command to collect the necessary number of troops to successfully check the enemy.

Mellenthin's version about the "prestigiousness" of the battle for Stalingrad has no actual basis in fact. Stalingrad was an important strategic point and a major industrial center of the USSR. The capturing of this city by the enemy would have led to the loss of the water artery linking the central regions of the USSR with the Caucasus. Moreover, as the chief of staff of the Supreme Command (OKW), Gen Field Mar W. Keitel confirmed in an interrogation in June 1945, the Nazi leadership counted on reaching the Volga "in one of the places in order to then capture the strategically important center of Stalingrad."[5] In denying this obvious fact, Mellenthin's version advanced by him 35 years after the end of the battle for the city on the Volga is aimed at playing down the world historical importance of the feat of the Soviet people at Stalingrad.

Also intentionally false is Mellenthin's explanation of the reasons for the Wehrmacht's defeat at Stalingrad supposedly by poor generalship qualities in the commander of the 6th German Army F. von Paulus who then headed the entire encircled grouping. Initially, Mellenthin accuses Von Paulus of the inability to promptly "recognize the fatal danger of encirclement" which hung over the 6th Army with the start of the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad on 19 November 1942. Then he accuses him of "unquestioned obedience" in precisely carrying out the orders received from above and not undertaking "independent actions" contrary to them in the aim of escaping from encirclement. Von Paulus is accused for the fact on 19 December he did not follow the instructions of E. Manstein and did not move the 6th Army toward the German troops endeavoring to relieve the surrounded grouping.[6]

Mellenthin requires accusations directed at Von Paulus merely to reduce the defeat of the Nazi troops at Stalingrad to chance. In actuality, Von Paulus is to be blamed for the defeat no more than the other Nazi military leaders who were involved in the Stalingrad battle, particularly the commander of the Group B, M. Weichs and Army Group Don E. Manstein, and the chief of the General Staff of the Army (OKH) K. Zeitzler.

Also invalid is Mellenthin's assertion that up to the end of November 1942, the 6th Army had a real opportunity to break out of the encirclement. Characteristically, even then Manstein did not believe in such a possibility recognizing that the 6th Army in order to break out of the ring of encirclement to the west or southwest would have to cross at least 150 km over open ground with exposed flanks and rears with the presence of strong Soviet troops on all sides. For this reason, to Zeitzler's request in the morning of 24 November Manstein advised not issuing instructions for the 6th Army to break out of the encirclement until a relieving operation had been prepared by the Army Group Don. Hitler's orders to Von Paulus on 24 November to hold Stalingrad were largely based on the advice given by Manstein.[7]

While Mellenthin and other bourgeois historians now criticize Von Paulus for "blind obedience," they do this clearly for the sake of declaring the Soviet Army's victory unnatural, in blaming one supposedly "insufficiently decisive" general.

Versions of the accidental nature of the Wehrmacht's defeat at Stalingrad are also supported by the English military historians A. Clark (in the section "Stalingrad" of the "Illustrated History of the World Wars" published in England under the editorship of A. Taylor in 1978) and D. Downing (in the work "The Devil's Virtuosos" published in New York in 1977 and devoted to praising the military art of the Nazi generals). Clark states that Stalingrad was not of important strategic significance, representing "nothing more than a geographic name on a map," while the Germans during the period of the Stalingrad Battle simply became "hostages of their own propaganda which constantly and evermore tenaciously pointed to the importance of this battle."[8] He points out the short-sightedness of Von Paulus apparent in his resumption at the beginning of October 1942 of the offensive in Stalingrad in the aim of capturing all its territory. These battles in the course of which the Nazis did not succeed in fully taking the city were, Clark writes, "the fiercest" and "finally sapped the defensive might of the German troops in the south of Russia" and actually made the Soviet counteroffensive at Stalingrad possible.[9]

D. Downing places the basic blame for the defeat at Stalingrad on Hitler who supposedly even before the start of the Wehrmacht's summer offensive and then in the course of it made fundamental errors which led to a weakening of the assault grouping of the Nazi troops advancing on the southern wing of the Soviet-German Front. Downing does not provide anything new for this problem. But his aim is obvious: if supposedly Hitler's mistakes had not existed then the catastrophe at Stalingrad would not have occurred.

Along with such a subjective factor as Hitler's "mistakes," Downing endeavors to also seek out "objective" factors which would support the idea voiced by him on the accidentalness of the Nazi defeat at Stalingrad. At times this approaches the bizarre. Thus, the author with full seriousness writes that in November 1942, the battleworthiness of the Nazi troops in the Stalingrad sector had been reduced because of mice. It turns out that in the 22d German Tank Division in the aim of camouflaging military equipment the tanks had been dug into the ground and covered on top with straw. The straw attracted the mice which, as Downing asserted, "with enormous, although unconscious loyalty to the Soviet cause gnawed through the rubber insulating on all electric wiring." As a result, when the tanks had to be started up and sent out on 19 November to repel the Soviet counteroffensive, 31 out of the 104 combat vehicles were out of commission. Moreover, another 53 tanks broke down on the way to the deployment line due to the inability to cross deep snow.[10]

But, as we know, it was not the individual miscalculations of the Nazi Command or the severity of the climate which led to the defeat of the Wehrmacht at Stalingrad. The main reasons for the victory of the Soviet troops were their unshakable tenacity, mass heroism and increased military skill. "There can be no doubt," emphasized I. V. Stalin, "that only the correct strategy of the Red Army Command and the flexible tactics of our line commanders could lead to such an outstanding fact as the encirclement and destruction of the enormous crack German Army consisting of 330,000 men...."[11] The Battle of Stalingrad showed anew the advantages of the Soviet state and social system, the correctness of the leadership of the nation and the Armed Forces by the Communist Party, the invincibility of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the sociopolitical unity of Soviet society as well as the enormous capabilities of its military organization.

The American writer W. Kerr in his book "The Secret of Stalingrad" points to the great importance of the Stalingrad Battle and terms it "the greatest engagement of all times."

"The unforeseen consequences of Stalingrad," he writes, "had a decisive impact not only on the war in the East, but also touched the war in the West." For Nazi Germany, his book emphasizes, Stalingrad marked a "defeat on the battlefield and the Third Reich could not recover from this defeat."[12] However, this book also doubts the legitimate nature of the Soviet Army's victory at Stalingrad. The "secret" of the Soviet victory at Stalingrad is seen by Kerr not in the able actions of the USSR Armed Forces, but rather in certain "secret reserves" in the Soviet strategic reserve army more than 1.5 million men strong, the presence of which was supposedly a "complete surprise" for the Nazi Command and about which the Western Allies of the USSR knew nothing.[13] In basing himself on this false premise, Kerr concludes that if the military-political leadership of Germany had known about the existence of the "enormous" reserves of the Soviet Union, then it would not have undertaken an offensive in the summer of 1942, there would have been no Battle of Stalingrad and a victory for the USSR Armed Forces in it.[14]

Thus, the Battle of Stalingrad and the victory of the Soviet troops in it is reduced by Kerr to a game of chance. In actuality, everything was not quite the way he tries to show it. The presence of strategic reserves in the Soviet Union in 1942 could not have been a "complete surprise" for the Nazi Command. Thus, at the end of August 1942, Nazi intelligence announced a soon-expected increase in the size of the Soviet troops by 1.4 million men.[15] Of course, the German military leadership did not have accurate data on our reserves. The Soviet Command was able to mislead the enemy as to those sectors where our strategic reserves were being concentrated and this is already a manifestation of the advantage of Soviet military art over the enemy.

Of definite interest are the methods of falsifying the Battle of Stalingrad employed by the West German historian J. Pickalkiewicz in his book "Stalingrad: The Anatomy of a Battle."[16] This author appears in the guise of supposed objectivity and proves his views by a tendentious selection of facts. In detail, week by week, the author describes the course of the Battle of Stalingrad. Accordingly, to the number of weeks, the book has 30 chapters. They all are organized uniformly and consist of three sections. The first section is called "The Germans Announce," the second is "The Soviets Announce," while the third is "This is How It Really Was." The last section is made up of additional materials which supposedly objectively show the events occurring during the week. By such a strategem, Pickalkiewicz endeavors to persuade the readers that he is not hiding anything from them and is showing the course of the battle dispassionately. In actuality, Pickalkiewicz's entire depiction of the Battle of Stalingrad is very partial.

Pickalkiewicz's tendentiousness in the choice of materials is apparent in all the chapters. And particularly so in the last chapter of the book devoted to the concluding, 30th week (from 1 through 7 February 1943) of the Stalingrad Battle. Here the author follows the path of disseminating the lies of Nazi propaganda about the events which occurred at Stalingrad. Pickalkiewicz follows the same line in the third section where the materials given by him emphasize the "stubbornness" of the surrounded Nazi troops and their "loyalty" to military duty.[18]

The heroes of Stalingrad are well known to the world. But these were not the soldiers of the Nazi Wehrmacht as Pickalkiewicz and others assert, but rather the Soviet soldiers who on the banks of the Volga were defending their socialist motherland against the Nazi invaders.

Thus, bourgeois historians employ diverse procedures to falsify the Battle of Stalingrad, focusing their main efforts on understating the legitimate defeat of the Wehrmacht on the Volga and underplaying the true sources of the Soviet Army's victory. But no matter how hard the ideologists of imperialism endeavor to distort the history of the battle on the Volga, they are unable to conceal the truth of the immortal feat by the Soviet soldiers in Stalingrad.

The truth about Stalingrad became known to the world even in the war years. The prominent American politician Joseph E. Davies who visited Moscow in May 1943 stated to representatives of the Soviet press: "Your Stalingrad is immortal. It is an example of that struggle which has been waged by other cities, large and small, where the Soviet people, in being subjected to similar hardships, have covered themselves with undying glory."[19] At present, the world historical importance of the Battle of Stalingrad is recognized by all progressive mankind. It has become a symbol of the unflinching courage and self-sacrifice of the Soviet soldiers and a vivid example of the high military art of our military leaders. It has shown the fundamental advantages of the socialist social and state system. No falsifiers of history will succeed in obscuring the greatness of the feat at Stalingrad.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 65.

2. R. Seth, "Stalingrad: Point of Return," New York, 1959, p 57.

3. J. Jukes, "Stalingrad: The Turning Point," New York, 1968, p 100.

4. F. Mellenthin, "German Generals of World War II: As I Saw Them," Norman, 1977, p 110.

5. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1961, p 84.

6. F. Mellenthin, op. cit., pp 113-117.

7. D. Downing, "The Devil's Virtuosos: German Generals at War 1940-1945," New York, 1977, p 121.

8. A. Clark, "Stalingrad," in "The Illustrated History of the World Wars," London, 1978, pp 354-355.

9. Ibid., p 355.

10. D. Downing, op. cit., pp 117-118.

11. I. Stalin, "O Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuza" [On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union], 5th Edition, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1950, p 93.

12. W. Kerr, "Das Geheimnis Stalingrad: Hintergrunde einer Entscheidungsschlacht," Dusseldorf, 1977, pp 5, 345.

13. Ibid., p 5.

14. Ibid., p 6.

15. M. Kehrig, "Stalingrad: Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht," Stuttgart, 1974, p 550.

16. J. Pickalkiewicz, "Stalingrad: Anatomie einer Schlacht," Munich, 1977.

17. [Not in text.]

18. Ibid., pp 452-456.

19. PRAVDA, 20 May 1943.

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CSO: 8144/0656

COMBINED-ARMS TRAINING FOR WARSAW PACT FORCES REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 26 Nov 82) pp 61-66

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Col N. Voloshin and Col V. Kolesov under the heading "In the Armies of the Socialist Countries": "Combined Exercises—The Highest and Most Effective Form of Training the Staffs and Troops of the Warsaw Pact Armies"]

[Text] The experience of history shows that one of the basic factors determining victory has always been a high level of troop training conforming to the demands of waging war. "The best army, the most dedicated persons to the cause of the revolution," emphasized V. I. Lenin, "will be immediately exterminated by the enemy if they are not sufficiently armed, supplied...and trained."[1]

At present, the timeliness and urgency of the problem of training armies have increased significantly. In the first place, this is due to the fact that while previously the flaws in the training of personnel could to some degree be eliminated in the course of a war, although this did involve excess losses in personnel and military equipment, in a modern war such a possibility is virtually excluded. Secondly, as weaponry has developed and its destructive capabilities increased, it is all the more difficult to bring the training situation closer to actual combat. Thirdly and more importantly, combat operations themselves have become much more complicated.

Over the years of the existence of the Warsaw Pact, on the territories of all the allied nations a number of joint exercises has been carried out. They all have differed in purpose, aims, tasks, spatial scope and the number of men and equipment participating in them.

Large joint command, staff and troop exercises began to be conducted by the Joint Warsaw Pact Armed Forces in 1961. In the course of them important tasks were carried out in improving the methods of collective defense for the socialist countries. The conducting of such exercises became possible due to the increased level of operational training of the leadership, the staffs and to the further strengthening of military cooperation. Under plans of the Joint Command, such major joint exercises and maneuvers were conducted as "October Storm" (1965), "Vltava" (1966), "Maneuver" (1967), "Thdope" (1967), "Oder—Neisse," "Fraternity in Arms," "Union," "Friendship," and "Shield" (1969-1982). [2]

Over the period of military cooperation among the fraternal armies, the practice of conducting joint exercises has also involved the tactical level, particularly the broadening of their range from the company to the divisional, inclusively. Starting in 1975, the Joint Armed Forces have conducted joint regimental tactical exercises, including exercises with field firing.

The joint exercises of the allied armies are carried out exclusively in the aim of maintaining the readiness of the Joint Armed Forces to repel aggression on the proper level and in no instance have the nature of a demonstrating of military might.

In the course of the exercises, under conditions as close as possible to actual combat, all the basic questions are actually worked through as related to the preparation and conduct of joint military operations by coalition groupings. The complete training of the commanders, staffs, troops and forces is tested and improved, the methods of conducting operations and combat actions are studied, combat experience is exchanged, high moral-political and combat qualities of internationalist fighters are formed in the men and other problems are solved. The basic merit of the joint exercises is that in the course of them the principle is realized of preparing each allied army and the Joint Armed Forces as a whole, in learning what is essential in a war.

The commanders during the exercises improve the methods for preparing the operations and combat actions and the work methods in taking sound decisions, setting tasks for subordinates, organizing and maintaining close cooperation, controlling the troops and forces and organizing all types of operational (combat), technical and rear support. The exercises involving the troops make it possible for the command to actually work out the questions of organizing attack groupings, repelling aggression and defeating the enemy, and carrying out regroupings. They can better study and more fully consider the specific features of the national field forces, formations and units and objectively assess their training level. The complex situation created in the exercises contributes to the forming in the command personnel of such valuable qualities as independence, decisiveness and the ability to find a way out of a difficult situation and to impose one's will and tactics on the "enemy."

Such exercises provide favorable opportunities for improving the training of the staffs of all levels and their teamwork. The increased amount of information, its rapid obsolescence, the necessity of considering a multiplicity of factors which influence the conduct of combat operations as well as the importance of carrying out various calculations place new, higher demands on the staffs as the basic control bodies. The executing of these tasks is also best ensured in joint exercises. The staffs train in collecting, generalizing and analyzing the situational data, in preparing conclusions for the taking of sound decisions by the commanders, the prompt issuing of tasks to the troops, the planning of operations and combat actions, the organizing and implementing of control of execution, the providing of aid to subordinates as well as in carrying out other measures.

It is also very important that the command and control bodies in the joint exercises gain good practice in **studying the probable enemy,** its composition, condition, views on the use of armed forces in a war as well as the possible nature of operations in a theater of war, in assessing and analyzing the development of military events, in anticipating the occurrence of crisis situations, the early taking of measures to weaken their consequences as well as in carrying out tasks posed in line with a suddenly changing situation. In them, an opportunity is provided to profoundly and thoroughly work out

such questions as repelling enemy strikes, conducting offensive actions, planning marches under difficult conditions, the use of various landing forces, the coordinating of efforts of the allied troops and navies, their complete logistical support and so forth.

Joint exercises serve as a higher schooling in improving the field, air and sea skills of the subunits, units and ships. In them the personnel, in working in a difficult situation, on diverse terrain, during the day and at night and in various weather conditions, masters the weapons and military equipment assigned to them and learns to be victorious over a strong, technically well-equipped enemy and to master the art of conducting modern combat with the full employment of the combat capabilities of the weapons.

In exercises, particularly those with field firing, good conditions are created for achieving an organic unity of movement and fire, hitting the targets with the first round and at maximum range, maneuvering in the aim of attacking the most vulnerable place in the enemy battle formation and improving the tactical and weapons training of the subunits and units.

Exceptionally important is the **role of joint exercises in improving the entire system of cooperation.** The organization of cooperation under modern conditions is characterized by definite complexity.

It is even more difficult to solve this problem when combat operations are conducted jointly by several allied armies. This is caused by the national features of the armies, by the level of their training, by the degree of technical equipping, by the presence of a language barrier and by other factors.

Joint exercises make it possible to work through the questions of cooperation most completely and thoroughly. In the course of them the commanders and staffs gain practical skills in coordinating efforts between the allied armies, the armed services, the field forces, formations and units, the assault groupings, the elements of the operational and combat configuration of the troops and forces and the bodies of technical and rear support in the interests of carrying out common tasks.

The Joint Military Command in the course of the exercises gives great attention not only to working out the questions of organizing and maintaining cooperation, but also to its rapid recovery in the event of disruption. The experience of exercises convinces one that the successful solving of these problems depends largely upon the exchange of operational groups, upon well organized reciprocal information and dependable communications.

The joint exercises are also very beneficial for increasing the professional skill of the generals, admirals and officers **in command and control of the troops and naval forces,** with the role of these constantly growing. The experience of the battles and engagements of previous wars teaches one that it is possible to have the most advanced weapons and well trained personnel, but if control and command are lost, then their combat capabilities remain untilized and the carrying out of the missions will be jeopardized. For precisely this reason, the problem of improving troop control is of important significance in the entire training system of the Joint Armed Forces.

The questions of control are most effectively worked out in joint exercises in those instances when a complex dynamic situation is created requiring from the commanders and staffs and ability to rapidly assess the developing situation, to respond promptly

to abrupt changes in the situation, to promptly take sound decisions as well as to correctly set and adjust the combat tasks for subordinate, attached and supporting troops. Moreover, the exercises provide an opportunity for the commanders and staffs to be visibly convinced of the soundness of the decisions taken.

Troop control is inconceivable without communications which are its material basis. In the exercises where they work on the methods for the skillful, rapid and dependable connecting of communications equipment and check out the coordination of the communications centers of the control posts of the units and formations in the fraternal armies, the appropriate officials gain good practical experience in using various types of communications equipment and improve their skills in troop leadership under the conditions of the failure of individual elements (links) in the control system, the moving of control posts and the carrying out of communications traffic in a difficult radio electronic situation.

The exercises help to overcome the language barrier, the consequences of which, as experience shows, are particularly tangible under the conditions of a fluid and dynamic situation.

The importance of the joint exercises is also that they **act as a testing range for scientific research, a connecting link between theory and practice and the basic way for testing in peacetime the correctness of theoretical concepts.** From the experience of them, it is possible to objectively assess the viability of theory, to detect weak points in troop training, to spot trends in the development of military affairs and to determine the optimum areas for realizing the achievements of military thought in the interests of increasing the combat might of the Joint Armed Forces.

Along with the improving of the methods for preparing and conducting combat operations, the exercises make it possible to study and develop the organizational structure of the troops, to determine the most rational balance of the armed services and branches of troops, to test the combat capabilities of the weapons and military equipment and seek out ways for further improving communications and automating troop control.

As a result of joint exercises, new theoretical provisions are worked out and practical recommendations elaborated and the Joint and national commands arrive at uniform views on the fundamental questions of military art, the theory and practice of troop training and indoctrination. In addition, they make it possible to promptly adjust the training programs considering the development of military affairs, the existing demands, the pending tasks and the changing military-political situation as well as coordinate the development plans of the fraternal armies.

As is known, instruction is more effective if it is inseparably linked to indoctrination. Joint exercises make it possible to best create for the trainees high combat tension and in the process of these various difficulties and surprises occur characteristic for a real combat situation. Under such conditions the men of different nationalities more successfully develop the required moral-combat and psychological qualities, a feeling of confidence in one's comrades in arms is developed as well as the ability to endure physical and psychological stresses, to maintain the capacity to work for an extended time, not to lose self-possession and to mobilize in oneself the inner forces for carrying out the set tasks.

In the course of exercises, opportunities are created to indoctrinate the servicemen in a spirit of patriotism and internationalism. In the process of them the men become aware that military service is essential, that they must be constantly ready to defend the socialist victories. Lenin's teachings on the defense of the victories of socialism serve as the basis for developing in the personnel of the fraternal armies such qualities as ideological conviction in the justness of the common cause, class hate for the enemy and a high feeling of responsibility for the defense of the socialist system. In the joint exercises the men and commanders from the armies of the various states always endeavor to help one another. Thus, in the exercises Friendship-82, the Czechoslovak helicopter pilots Majs K. Kozisek and S. Jasso and a group of Soviet helicopter pilots headed by Maj A. Pleshanov worked closely with the motorized rifle and tank troops and successfully carried out the set tasks. [3]

In the exercises Shield-82, in acting in a single combat formation, excellent cooperation was shown by the subunits of Bulgarian tank troops commanded by Capt G. Kharalampiev, the Soviet tank and motorized rifle troops of Sr Lt A. Volokhin and Capt P. Markeyev, the motorized rifle troops of the Bulgarian People's Army of Sr Lt T. Vasilev and the GDR People's Army Lt Col H. Stenzel. [4]

The joint exercises, as a higher form of training the staffs and the troops, make it possible to strengthen the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces, to follow the conformity of their state to modern demands, to work out complex questions of all-round support for combat operations, to fruitfully and effectively exchange advanced experience in personnel training and indoctrination as well as carry out other important tasks.

The diversity of questions and tasks carried out in joint exercises helps to improve the combat training and organize cooperation as well as strengthen friendship between the men of the fraternal countries. This is confirmed by the high praise which has been given by the mininsters of defense from the fraternal armies to this for instruction.

For example, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, emphasized: "A major role is played by joint exercises where our men learn the difficult and complex art of being victorious and strengthen their international friendship. All of this helps to further raise the combat capability of our armies, to strengthen their combat skill and to improve moral and political unity." [5]

The particular importance of the joint exercises can also be seen from the fact that their preparation and conduct are directed by the ministers of defense, the commander-in-chief and chief of staff of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States and other senior officials. In particular, the exercise Fraternity in Arms-80 was directed by the GDR Minister of National Defense, Army Gen H. Hoffmann, the exercise Alliance-81 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, Mar SU V. G. Kulikov, the exercise Friendship-82 by the Polish Deputy Minister of National Defense and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces, Armor Gen E. Molczik and the exercise Shield-82 by the Bulgarian Minister of National Defense, Army Gen D. Dzhurov.

The command of the aggressive NATO bloc also gives great importance to joint exercises, considering them a basic form in training the troops, officers and staffs of the NATO armies. The bloc's leadership views joint exercises not only as a most important form for increasing the combat might of its military organization, but also as an effective

means for testing its readiness to carry out the aggressive plans for the pretenders to world domination. Thus, they have the nature of militaristic preparations and the showing of strength and are aimed against the socialist states. In essence, they are a rehearsal for the planned aggression.

In the NATO Armed Forces, the number of conducted exercises, their scale and the composition of the involved troops have been continuously growing. Suffice it to say that in 1973-1978, each year they annually conducted 160-180 various exercises and maneuvers.[6] There has been a tendency for their number and scope to increase in recent years. Indicative is the composition of the men and equipment involved in the exercises. For example, the exercises Autumn Forge-80 involved over 300,000 servicemen, 15,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 2,000 combat aircraft and around 500 ships of all the NATO countries.[7] A significant portion of the exercises is conducted in direct proximity to the frontiers of the socialist commonwealth.

The Warsaw Pact countries, in undertaking constructive steps aimed at improving the military-political situation in the world, at the same time are forced to strengthen their defense potential. As long as the NATO bloc exists and it continues to increase its military potential in its desire to achieve military superiority, the Warsaw Pact states will take all the necessary measures for maintaining their defense capability on a proper level.

"The prime concern of our party," stated the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, at the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "will be to strengthen the socialist commonwealth. In unity lies our strength and the guarantee for the ultimate success even in the most serious trials."[8]

The joint exercises conducted by the armies of the fraternal nations make a significant contribution to improving the defense of socialist victories, to strengthening friendship and to patriotic and international indoctrination of the military and workers of the Warsaw Pact states.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 408.
2. "Varshavskiy Dogovor--soyuz vo imya mira i sotsializma" [The Warsaw Pact--An Alliance for the Sake of Peace and Socialism], Voyenizdat, 1980, pp 153-155.
3. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 January 1982.
4. Ibid., 29 September 1982.
5. D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 348.
6. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 8, Voyenizdat, p 239.
7. NATO REVIEW, October 1980, p 32.
8. PRAVDA, 23 November 1982.

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CSO: 8144/0656

COMMENTARY ON U.S., BRITISH USE OF DECEPTION IN WORLD WAR II

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 26 Nov 82) pp 67-73

[Article by Col Gen V. Meshcheryakov under the heading "In Foreign Armies": "Deception in the Operations of the U.S. and British Armed Forces in World War II"]

[Text] In World War II great attention was paid to the questions of deception ["maskirovka"] as one of the most important types of support for troop combat activities. By deception one understood a range of measures aimed at confusing the enemy about one's true intentions on the eve and in the course of the war and the plans for the organizational development, composition, condition and combat capabilities of the armed forces, their groupings and operational plans. In terms of scale and the nature of tasks, deception was divided into strategic, operational and tactical. Its aim was to achieve surprise in troop and naval actions.

The theoretical bases of operational deception abroad were worked out even in the prewar period. In the course of World War II these underwent further development. Thus, in 1940, the English general A. Wavell in his memorandum established the need to create a special body for working out plans, coordinating and conducting operations to mislead the enemy.

In the spring of 1941, under the personal staff of the English Prime Minister W. Churchill, a special body was established known as the London Coordination Committee (LCC) the aim of which was to work out and implement special operations to mislead the Nazi leadership on the strategic plans of the Allies against Germany. A characteristic example of deception was the measures to prepare and conduct the operation by English forces under the code name of Torch in North Africa in October-November 1942. In the course of this operation the plan was to capture beachheads on the territory of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and then in cooperation with the 8th British Army operating in Egypt and Libya to defeat the Italo-German troops on the African continent.

As a cover for Operation Torch the plan was to make a landing in the north of France (a raid on Dieppe) in order to divert a portion of the German forces from the Mediterranean and to "prove" to the Soviet Union that the opening of a second front in Europe was impossible in 1942-1943.

The preparation for the cover started with a broadcast by BBC warning the French people that it was dangerous to be in the northern regions of the nation due to the

forthcoming combat operations there. It was announced that the USSR and Great Britain had agreed to open a second front in 1942.[1] In addition, rumors of the pending invasion were disseminated through the press, agents and diplomatic channels. The Vatican was "informed" that the invasion would occur in the area of Pas de Calais. For this reason, the Vatican urged all believers to leave the possible area of combat operations. All summer English aircraft made flights over French and Belgian territory. Sabotage was carried out widely on the French coast.

As a result, even in March 1942, the Nazi command began building the so-called Atlantic Rampart and on 9 July the Fuhrer announced that an Allied landing in the north of France was possible and, consequently, the necessity had arisen of reinforcing the German troops in this area. On 14 August in the area of the port of Dieppe, a landing commenced under the plan of Operation Jubilee. As was assumed, it was a complete failure. But the deception measures had misled the enemy and had forced the Nazi leadership to keep a portion of its forces in France. This made it easier for the Allies to carry out the tasks in the Mediterranean where in 1941-1942 the situation was not developing in favor of the English.

In October 1942, English troops under the command of Gen Montgomery had begun to carry out the El-Alamein Offensive Operation (Lightfoot) in the course of which, together with Operation Torch the expelling of the Italo-German troops from Africa was to be completed. According to the plan for this operation, the main thrust was to be made on the right (northern) flank by the XXX Corps. The X Tank Corps made up the second echelon and was to crush the enemy tank forces. An auxiliary thrust was to be made on the southern flank with the forces of the XIII Corps. The start of the offensive was planned for the night of 23-24 October. Bertran was the name given to the deception plan to cover Operation Lightfoot. It pursued two goals: to achieve surprise and to force the enemy to keep its reserve, the 21st Tank Division, as long as possible on the southern flank and thereby ensure a maximum advantage in tanks in the sector of the main thrust. The deception measures should persuade the German Command that the English would go over to an offensive not on 23 October, but on 7 November, their main forces were concentrated in the south and a subsidiary strike was planned in the north; in addition, an amphibious landing was being prepared for the German rear. For these purposes, the English prepared an area for the concealed concentration of the X Tank Corps by the spurious enlarging of the supply depot in the surroundings of El-Imayid (18 km to the east of El-Alamein). In addition to the existing real structures on an area of 10 x 25 km in size close to the roads they erected a number of false depot structures and here were located real combat equipment as well as dummies of tanks and other weapons.

Some 5 days before the start of the offensive, the X Tank Corps openly began moving southwest and positioned itself in three temporary concentration areas which were echeloned from the northeast to the southwest and externally proved that the corps would operate on the left (southern) flank. But during the 3 last days before the offensive, the tank units were shifted to the spurious area, the tanks took up the places of the dummies and these were shifted to the places of the departed tanks. The move was made along a single route, in a single track, and the German air reconnaissance was unable to detect any changes in the position of the English troops. In order to further persuade the enemy that the X Tank Corps would operate on the left flank, the English maintained the entire communications system of the disbanned 8th Tank Division.

To ensure concealment in concentrating artillery in the sector of the main thrust, two areas were prepared in which, along with real guns and self-propelled artillery mounts, intentionally poorly made dummies were emplaced so that the enemy would discover them and decide that they were endeavoring to deceive it and cause the enemy to believe that the main forces were being concentrated on the right flank. After the Germans had repeatedly photographed the artillery concentration areas from the air, the dummies were replaced by real artillery systems.

In order to force the enemy to believe that the basic tank grouping was being concentrated on the southern flank, in the zone of the XIII Corps a false supply depot was created and a dummy water line "laid." The pace of the spurious work was set in such a manner that the construction of the latter [the pipeline] commenced on 26 September could be completed only at the beginning of November.

Moreover, through various channels false rumors were widely spread on the forthcoming conference of the superior English command personnel in Cairo on the day the offensive was to start. In order to give this verisimilitude, rooms were reserved in Cairo hotels and the unexpected "appearance of Gen Montgomery" was organized in the area of Cairo.

In the aim of simulating an amphibious landing operation, several hours prior to the start of the offensive, in the German rear four torpedo launches made a show of force off the coast. Sometime later, the English aviation suddenly began bombing the coast and the troops in the interior and dropped illuminating bombs while the long-range artillery shelled heavily. The boats illuminated by German searchlights were forced to retreat to sea, taking cover behind a dense smokescreen. Soon thereafter, the enemy heard a roar of motors, the thunder of anchor chains and the thuds of large-caliber naval artillery. Colored lights burst in the sky. The alarmed Germans immediately raised all available aviation into the air and deployed the 90th Motorized Division to defend the coast. When the smoke dissipated, instead of a powerful enemy they discovered only several old decrepit hulls and on them amplifiers with loudspeakers.

The conducted measures made it possible to achieve complete surprise in the offensive and mislead the enemy on the sector of the main thrust and thereby ensure the piecemeal deafeat of the German tank forces.

The Solo-I Deception Operation, worked out to cover Operation Torch by confusing the enemy on the place the troop ships would land on continental Europe and the time of their setting to sea, was also successfully carried out. After the convoys had left for the Atlantic, the second part of the plan for this operation, Solo-II, went into effect. This was to convince Hitler that the Allies were planning to land in Dakar (West Africa). The Germans stationed up to 40 submarines between Gibraltar and Dakar. However, they were suddenly shifted to a convoy of transport vessels traveling from England to the United States while at that time an armada of vessels passed through the Straits of Gibraltar carrying 200,000 soldiers and combat equipment onboard. The men and equipment were landed without interference at the designated places.

In the given instance, deception played a positive role in the success of the Anglo-American Allies, but the main reason was that the basic attention of the Nazi leadership was focused on the Eastern Front where the Battle of Stalingrad was underway. By November 1942, 266 divisions were fighting on the Soviet-German Front, including 193.5 German ones, while on the other fronts the Germans had 71 divisions

(35 in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, 14 in Denmark and Norway, 7 in the Balkans and 15 in Germany, Poland, Austria and Czechoslovakia).[2]

Under these conditions, the Allies in the Anti-Nazi Coalition obtained every opportunity to carry out their obligations and open up a second front in Western Europe. But the United States and Great Britain as before were counting on the mutual exhaustion of the USSR and Germany. Churchill and Roosevelt agreed in May 1943 in Washington that the opening of the second front would be moved to 1944.

On 12 February 1944, the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the allied expeditionary forces in Europe (COSSAC) finally set the date and the goal of the operation to open up a second front under the code name Overlord. In preparing for this operation, great attention was given to achieving surprise for the landing forces.

The active elaboration of measures to conceal the plan for Overlord started at the beginning of 1943. The plan for operational deception was given the code name of the Jael Plan (subsequently, Bodyguard). It envisaged the following: active intelligence activities to provide the Allied Command with accurate data on Hitler's plans, on the defensive structures of the Atlantic Rampart and on the number and grouping of German troops; by constant counterintelligence activities to eliminate the German espionage network in Europe and on U.S. territory and to prevent the leaking of secret information; by maximum use of the Resistance groups in the occupied countries to intensify acts of sabotage and diversion; by active propaganda to isolate Hitler from the German people; by carrying out deception operations to confuse the enemy and to conceal from it the true scale of the landing operation, the time and place of the landing.

Simultaneously with the working out of the Jael Plan, a series of feints was carried out in the aim of concealing Allied intentions in the Mediterranean and above all a landing on the island of Sicily. For covering up the landing on this island (Operation Husky) a deception plan was worked out under the code name of Trojan Horse, the main aim of which was to persuade Hitler that they were planning to land in two areas: in Greece to prepare a strike across the Balkans and on the island of Sardinia to prepare for an invasion of Southern France.

The particular Mincemeat Plan was the basic part of the overall Trojan Horse Plan. In accord with this, off the coast of Spain the body of an English naval officer was dropped carrying "secret documents" from which it was clear that the Allied landing on the island of Sicily was an effective deception measure while in reality the landing was being prepared for the island of Sardinia and Greece. The "documents" reached Berlin. The German Staff believed them. In a letter to Mussolini, Hitler announced that he was concerned not by the opening of a second front in 1943, but rather by the possible landing of the Allies in the Balkans.[3] For even greater persuasiveness, another body of an English serviceman was dropped off the shores of Sardinia. The "documents" found on it belonged to a member of a small diversionary group which was reconnoitering the Sardinian coast. Simultaneously, false data on the intensions of the Allies to land in Greece were passed via the Spanish ambassador in London to the Spanish minister of foreign affairs. The deception was successful and on 9-10 May, the Allies without hinderance landed their troops on the island of Sicily.

Important deception measures were carried out in Ankara in 1943. English intelligence had succeeded in "feeding" the Germans a number of authentic secret and top-secret

documents. These disclosed certain aspects of the Overlord Plan and the Allied strategic plans for the concluding stage of the war. However, Hitler, considering these documents spurious, did not believe them. Nevertheless, two basic results were achieved: the Germans received proof of the strength of the Allies and their intention to finally open a second front. Himmler via Schellenberg began talks in Stockholm about concluding a peace without Hitler. Troops were reinforced in Southeast Europe.

In revealing the code name of the operation to land troops in France, the Allies lost nothing since from September 1943 Overlord became the code name of all operational-strategic operations in Western Europe. Immediately the operation of a landing on the Atlantic coast of France, that is, the naval part of Overlord, was given the code name Neptune and this, in the opinion of the Allies, provided its secrecy.

The Jael Plan was renamed Bodyguard. It included a number of measures to confuse the enemy on the true intentions of the Allies in Northwestern Europe for 1944. This plan pursued two goals. In the first place, in employing a range of deception measures, to force the Nazi command to spread out its resources so that by the start of the landing the enemy would not have sufficient forces in Normandy. Secondly, to prevent the carrying out of retaliatory measures by undermining and destabilizing the system of communications, supply and control as well as the enemy intelligence network.

The defeat of the Nazi troops on the Soviet-German Front in 1943 led to an abrupt change in the military-strategic and political situation in the world. This forced the Allies to agree to the need to open a second front in the north of France in 1944. As a result, the basic aim of the measures to deceive the enemy also changed. Now the basic aim of the Bodyguard Plan was to force Hitler to withdraw as many troops as possible from France.

For achieving these aims, the Bodyguard Plan provided for the elaboration of a close-to-real plan for combat operations which the Nazi Command could believe, but which would mislead it as to the time and place of the landing. For this it was essential to convince the enemy that:

1. The Allies supposedly intended to defeat Germany by intensifying bombing of objectives on German territory. For this reason, their landing in France would start not before July. Because of this, the shifting of German troops in the aim of reinforcing defenses in any area of Western Europe was ill-advised.

2. The Allies planned to start combat operations in different points of Norway in the spring of 1944 in the aim of forcing Sweden to join them and thus gain an opportunity to use its ports and airfields for covering a summer landing in Denmark.

3. The Allies would need at least 50 divisions for carrying out a landing operation in France. Neither the men nor the equipment for the landing would be ready before summer.[4] Since an Allied landing in France was possible only at the end of the summer, their basic efforts in the spring would be aimed at the Balkans.

4. The USSR could not commence a summer offensive before the end of July.

Of undoubted interest is the organizing of wide-scale deception for the preparation and execution of the largest amphibious landing operation of World War II in Normandy

(under the Neptune Plan). Due to the successfully executed measures for surprise and deception under the Fortitude Plan, the Allies succeeded in concealing from the enemy the area of the amphibious landing as well as the time for the start of the landing operation.

The Fortitude Deception Plan consisted of two parts: Fortitude North and Fortitude South. Its implementation was to start on 18 June 1943. The plan of Fortitude North was to persuade the enemy that the Allied troop landing would be carried out in Norway. The purpose of the operation was to hold 27 enemy divisions in Denmark, Norway and Finland waiting for the Anglo-American-Russian landing. Since the forces for carrying out this operation did not exist in Europe, the appearance of their existence was to be created. For the Germans the story was put out that a non-existant 4th English Army, non-existant Russian forces together with a real U.S. XV Corps were ready to invade Norway.

The aim of the plan of Fortitude South was to confuse the enemy on the number of Allied troops and the supposed landing places in Northern France. The purpose was to suggest to the German Command that in Southwest England the U.S. 1st Army Group had been deployed consisting of 50 divisions and prepared to land in the area of Pas de Calais (Operation Quicksilver). Thus, the Allies planned on holding the strongest German 15th Army in this area. Component parts of Operation Fortitude South were the particular operations of Ironside and Vendetta designed, respectively, to hold the 1st German Army in the area of Bordeaux by threatening a landing from the Bay of Biscay and the 19th Army in the area of Marseille.

According to Allied intelligence data, the German Command was expecting a landing in the area of Pas de Calais and this was confirmed by the strengthening of fortifications and the concentrating of troops in this sector. Since the Allied Command assumed that it would be impossible to conceal the preparations for the invasion of Northern France, the basic portion of the deception was to mislead the enemy about the time, place and scope of the operation.

The Fortitude Plan envisaged the broad use of dummies for visual deception. While the invasion forces were being concentrated in Southwest England, spurious areas for the concentration of troops and naval forces were being created in the area of Pas de Calais. Dummy aircraft were set up on previously unused airfields. Dummy landing vessels including inflated rubber or canvas ones on rafts appeared in bays and river mouths. Blackout violations were used to simulate "signs of life" at these places. Rubber models of various military equipment were transported in large amounts into this area.

The German air reconnaissance was allowed during the day to observe troops marching toward the landing vessels. However, it did not see the troops return at night to the previous place in order to repeat the same march on the following day. The Germans had the impression of the accumulating of forces in the vessel loading areas. However, visual deception alone was not sufficient and the Allied Command located a false staff of the 1st American Army Group in the area of Dover. Lt Gen G. Patton who was well known in Germany was appointed as the commander of the non-existant army group. The Germans were persuaded that Patton would be in the main sector of the invasion. [5]

Carefully organized radio traffic between the real staff in Portsmouth and the false staff of the 1st Army Group played an important role in simulating the concentration of forces of the 1st Army Group and their preparations for the invasion.

The command of the Allied troops undertook measures to prevent the leaking of information about the preparations for the operation. At the start of March, the English War Cabinet banned the unauthorized entry or leaving of the local population from the areas where the troops were being concentrated and trained. It also restricted postal and telegraph communications with the troops. From 6 April in England leaves were canceled for servicemen. The diplomatic representatives of the neutral and Allied states (with the exception of the USSR, the United States and British Dominions) as of 15 April were prevented from leaving England without special permission, they were unable to send or receive uncensored messages by telegraph or diplomatic mail as well as receive couriers from abroad.[6]

Not long before the landing the Allies carried out Operation Copperhead in the course of which a double of Gen Montgomery feigned his presence in Spain. This was to persuade the Nazi Command that Montgomery was not in England and for this reason there would be no landing by Allied troops in the north of France at the beginning of June.

As a result of the measures carried out, at the end of May the Allies had succeeded in convincing Germany that around 100 divisions had been deployed in England. including seven or eight airborne ones. Hitler assumed that the landing could start in Normandy or Brittany, however the main thrust would be made in the area of Pas de Calais. But on 4 and then on 6 June, on the day it was to start, the Fuhrer stated that the basic place of the Allied landing would be Normandy. For this reason fortification work was intensified there. But for another 6 days, the troops remained in Pas de Calais waiting for a second major Allied landing operation.

The given examples of strategic deception carried out in the U.S. and British Armed Forces in World War II show that the main purpose was to achieve surprise which is viewed by Western military specialists as one of the basic principles in conducting a war.[7]

The foreign manuals emphasize that the task of deception is to provide the enemy commander with "information" on the basis of which he would take a decision advantageous to the other side. To do this it is essential to have a profound knowledge of the enemy intelligence and information system and its means of intelligence. It is also recommended that the leadership and command personnel be studied, that is, to know the way of thinking of specific individuals, their character, habits and so forth.[8]

The postwar activities of the U.S. and NATO military-political leadership shows that the organization of deception measures has assumed a leading role not only in the military, but also the political area. The U.S. administration under the cover of the false slogan of the "Soviet military threat" is rapidly increasing its nuclear missile potential and is hatching plans for unleashing a new world nuclear war against the USSR and the other nations of the socialist commonwealth. Under these conditions, exceptionally high vigilance is required from the Soviet people and particularly from the men of the Soviet Army and Navy.

FOOTNOTES

1. A. C. Brown, "A Bodyguard of Lies," London, 1977, p 83.

2. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 6, Voyenizdat, 1976, pp 19, 21.

3. A. C. Brown, op. cit., p 287.

4. Ibid., pp 433-434.

5. Ibid., p 475.

6. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...," Vol 8, 1977, p 254.

7. MILITARY REVIEW, September 1981, p 6.

8. "U.S. Army Field Manual FM 90-2," pp 1-6.

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CSO: 8144/0656

MILITARY HISTORY: WARTIME STRATEGY OF ANCIENT STATES REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 26 Nov 82) pp 74-80

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences, Docent, Col (Ret) I. Kravchenko under the heading "Scientific Papers": "Characteristic Traits of Strategy in the Wars of Slaveholding States"]

[Text] The long age of slaveholding societies [1] abounds in bloody wars which were waged in the aim of plundering and enslaving other peoples. These were predatory, unjust wars which were the continuation of the policy of slaveholders by violent methods. By wars an influx of free manpower was basically achieved. These were slaves without which the slaveholding society could not exist. At that time, due to the necessary resistance to predatory wars, wars of another sort also arose and these were just, liberation wars. In both a role was played by economic and moral factors as well as the dependence of troop morale upon the nature of war.

In the course of the armed struggle, a military organization of slaveholding states arose and military art was established and achieved a certain level (in the form of strategy and tactics). Later this had a marked influence upon the military art of subsequent eras. Its individual principles (selecting the direction of the main thrust, the massing of men and weapons, surprise, close cooperation between the branches of troops and others) have remained unchanged up to the present. The aim of this article is to show from historical examples the characteristic traits of strategy in the wars of a slaveholding society.

The development of military strategy, like military art as a whole, began in deep antiquity simultaneously with the dividing of society into classes and the rise of armies and wars. This process reflected the state of the productive forces in one or another socioeconomic formation and was directly dependent upon it. Thus, in the **period of early slaveholding states,** particularly in the first stage of their existence, the economy of the slaveholding society made it possible to have only comparatively small armies (from several thousand to several tens of thousands of men). At that time, strategy provided for the carrying out of the simplest tasks since wars in a majority of instances were "slave hunting" and had the nature of improvised military raids by some peoples against others in the aim of plundering the countries and taking prisoners.

With the growth of production and the population, with the increased size of the armies and the improved weapons and acquired military experience, the military capabilities

of the early slaveholding states grew and the tasks and functions of strategy as the highest area of military art became more complex. The strongest states, instead of brief raids against nearby lands, began to carry out large predatory campaigns and to wage extended wars in the aim of conquering other countries and peoples. This can be seen, for example, from the very extensive conquests of the Egyptian pharaohs Tutmose III (1524-1473 B.C.) and Ramses II (1317-1251 B.C.), the Assyrian king Sennacherib (705-680 B.C.) and Persia during the reign of Cyrus II (died in 530 B.C.).

Wars began to be waged on the basis of elaborated plans and early preparation while victory over the enemy was achieved not only by the force of weapons, but also by the art of the military leader, by his ability to utilize for his own interests the political situation and the particular features in the theater of military operations, by the choice of the moment for making the main thrust and so forth.

The size of armies in such vast states as the Persian Achaemenid Empire, the Chinese Han Empire and the Roman Empire, in wartime reached 200,000-300,000 men. However, due to the lack of food in the field and the difficulties of transporting it to the areas of military operations, it was rare to have armies over 100,000 men.

In a majority of the armies, the infantry was the basic branch of troops. In the Ancient East, in addition, the cavalry was developed, war chariots and detachments of soldiers on elephants and camels were widely employed. The coastal states had a fleet.

During the **period of the flourishing of slaveowning society,** when commodity-monetary relations became widespread, the greatest successes in the area of military affairs were achieved by the states of Ancient Greece which in economic terms greatly surpassed the countries of the Ancient East. This made it possible for them to better man and arm their armies, placing the main emphasis not on the number of troops, but rather on their increased combat capability. During the designated period, the role of military art increased further and the dependence of strategy upon the policy of the ruling class intensified. This dependence common to the military art of any age was subsequently clearly formulated by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. "Strategy," pointed out V. I. Lenin, "is subordinate to policy and both are inseparably linked."[2]

The Ancient Greek states and their armies led by capable leaders prepared carefully for wars in political, purely military, economic, diplomatic and moral terms, they endeavored to guess the enemy's plans, to mislead it on their own intentions and force it to make a wrong step in order to fight under more favorable conditions and have greater chances of success.

In the aim of achieving victory, much attention was paid to the creation of military-political alliances and to the breaking up of such alliances among the enemy. For this, all ways and means were used including the bribing of officials in the enemy camp.

While the generals of the large Eastern armies, due to the impossibility of supplying them with food and fodder over an extended time, endeavored at any price to force the enemy into battle and to victoriously conclude the war in the shortest time, the small Greek armies, before engaging the enemy in a decisive battle, endeavored first to wear it down and by skillful maneuvers to force it to split its forces. The battles and engagements were forced on the opposite side or entered into only with strong

chances of victory. In invading enemy territory, the Greek troops first occupied the main strategic points and then, relying on these, continued the conquests. In order to be less dependent upon local resources, stores of food and fodder were prepared ahead of time. A portion of these were carried with the troops while the remainder were transported in and stored in fortified points.

It was the Greek states which first began to coordinate the operations of armies and navies.

The highest achievement in the strategy of the Ancient Greek states is linked with the military activities of Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.) who during the war with Persia fought according to a previously conceived plan after thorough preparations for the war. As a result chance was minimized. He opposed the numerical superiority of the Persians with a campaign-tempered efficient army which was supplied with food, seige engines and equipment for crossing water barriers.

The crucial victory in the Battle of Granicus made it possible for Alexander the Great to conquer Asia Minor and in the Battle of Issus, Anterior Asia, after which the path was open into Central Persia.

It should be pointed out that by conquering Anterior Asia, he deprived the Persian Empire of its fleet and eliminated the threat of a Persian invasion of Greece from the sea.

The victory at Gaugamela led to the fall of the entire Achaemenids and at Hydaspes ensured the conquering of Northwest India (Diagram 1). The Greek troops fought successfully in all seasons and on any terrain. However, the campaigns were basically undertaken in summertime in order to most effectively utilize the favorable climatic and economic factors (harvesting).

If a general did not succeed in taking a certain fortress quickly, he beseiged it with a portion of his forces and led the main ones onward. But when the fortresses had particular military-strategic significance and could become a base and center for the concentration of enemy forces in the rear (Miletus, Halicarnassus, Tyre and Gaza), Alexander took them without regard to time and losses.

A crucial factor making it possible for Alexander to wage war victoriously an enormous distance from Greece was the fact that his army was regularly supplied with everything essential for life and the conduct of combat operations and also had secure rears and lines of communications. This was achieved primarily by a flexible policy vis-a-vis the peoples conquered by the Persians. In contrast to his enemy, Alexander waged war under a slogan of liberating them from Persian suppresion, returning to them their former laws destroyed by the Persians, easing taxation and respecting local rites, mores and religions. For this reason many inhabitants of the countries conquered by the Persians greeted the Macedonians as liberators, supplied them with food and filled out their ranks with volunteers. Alexander's army as it advanced in depth not only did not grow weaker but, on the contrary, became stronger. Having commenced the war with 40,000 troops, in the Battle of Gaugamela he already had 50,000 men and by the start of the conquest of India, 135,000 men. This occurred under conditions when the enemy suffered definite combat losses and in addition had to leave garrisons everywhere in the major cities for strengthening the conquered areas and ensuring the lines of communication with Macedonia. Only 38,000 recruits arrived from Greece and Macedonia.



Diagram 1. Campaigns of Alexander the Great

Key: 1--Macedonia before 336 B.C.; 2--Route of Alexander's army; 3--Craterus route; 4--Route of Nearchus fleet; 5--Sites and years of major battles; 6--Extended seige of fortress cities; 7--Major cities founded by Alexander the Great; 8--Territory conquered by Alexander the Great; 9--New capital of Alexander's state; 10--Numbers on map designate: 1--Bosporus Kingdom.

However, the enormous empire of Alexander the Great created by the conquering of many countries and peoples was an unstable military-administrative formation. After the death of Alexander it broke up into individual states and continuous wars were waged between these. Thus, the attempt of the Macedonian king to achieve world domination for his country failed completely.

Of all the ancient states, Ancient Rome had provided the most outstanding examples of military art. It also set out on the path of winning world domination, however it acted gradually and circumspectly. The Roman Senate and later the emperors even in peacetime carefully followed the international situation and relations between neighboring states. In following the principle of "divide and rule," they endeavored in every possible way to prevent the formation of anti-Roman alliances, and conversely, endeavored to have more allies. The Romans set one state against another, they intervened into their affairs and played on internal contradictions. Under the guise of justice and magnanimity, Rome protected the weakest peoples in order to isolate the strong ones and then endeavored to conquer both. The rulers of Rome constantly carried out political and military intelligence and due to this they always had data on the neighboring states, including on their internal economic and political situation, the mood of the people and political parties, military forces, fortresses and military leaders.

If prior to the start of a war it was impossible to break up the anti-Roman alliance, they endeavored to do this in the course of the war. Diplomacy was most skillfully employed in the service of strategy by Julius Caesar (102 or 100–44 B.C.). Thus, due to skillful diplomatic steps, in the conquest of Transalpine Gaul (58-51 B.C.) he did not permit its people to pool their efforts in the struggle for independence. As a whole, by force of arms the Romans merely reinforced what had been achieved by clever policy, by skillful and perfidious diplomacy. "The might of Rome consists not in its military power," commented Hannibal,[3] but rather in its ability to divide the enemies."[4]

Having decided to commence a war against one or another nation, Rome sought a pretext for it seeing to it that the opposite side initiated the declaration of war. This was done to justify Rome's aggressive plans and actions to its own and other peoples and pursued the aim of obtaining their sympathy and support.

Having entered a war, the Romans waged it with exceptional decisiveness and tenacity. It was their constant rule to fight on foreign land and to resolve the outcome of the war by the complete rout of the enemy forces. They fought particularly victoriously under the command of Julius Caesar. By speed and surprise this general often made up for a shortage of his forces, he confused the enemy and, in utilizing this, dealt it a crushing defeat. "Time is most precious of all. Julius Caesar was victorious by his speed,"[5] said Suvorov. Napoleon also had high regard for his military art: "The rules of Caesar were the same followed by Alexander and Hannibal: keep your forces in a group, do not have vulnerable places, rush with speed against the most important points, use the morale factor, the glory of weapons, the fear which they instill as well as political means for securing the loyalty of allies and for keeping the peoples conquered by them in obedience."[6]

In order to hold a conquered nation in obedience, Rome left a portion of its troops in it, keeping garrisons in fortress cities, and it also founded military-agricultural colonies populated by Romans, chiefly veterans. Thus, the Romans, like no one else, were able to retain the land conquered by weapons by using the plow.

One of the characteristic features in Roman strategy was that it endeavored to fight using the manpower of conquered peoples and allies. For this reason the Roman troops were based upon legions manned by recruits from conquered countries and allied troops. The actual Roman legions comprised only the core of the army.

The Romans achieved great results in the area of the combat employment of the navy and the coordinating of its operations with the operations of the army. This was most apparent in the Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage (264-146 B.C.) and primarily in the First Punic War (264-241 B.C.). In the course of this, the struggle for supremacy in the Western Mediterranean was the fundamental question in the strategy of the sides. The Roman victories at sea determined its outcome. Their fleet, due to the more advanced methods of armed combat (the use of the "corvus"[7] on ships and boarding combat), successfully withstood the enemy fleet. It also transported and landed its armies on the enemy coast and carried out blockade actions.

Troop shipments by the Roman fleet achieved great scope in the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.) which made it possible for the Romans, regardless of the enemy invasion of Italy, to conquer extensive territories on the Pyrenean Peninsula and in Sicily, to cross into Africa and ultimately achieve victory over Carthage (Diagram 2). The river naval flotillas were widely employed for assisting the armies deep in the continental theaters.

By the middle of the 2d Century A.D., Rome, having conquered a significant portion of the then-known lands, had exhausted its offensive capabilities and went over to a strategic defense. This was explained primarily by the fact that a slaveholding society by that time had entered a **period of decay and decline** (2d-5th Centuries A.D.). The military organization and military art of slaveholding states noticeably weakened and this was brought about by their general crisis. Moreover, the growing influx into the Roman Army of mercenaries from the conquered nations and for whom the interests of Rome were essentially alien worsened and lowered the morale of the troops. "With such troops...," wrote F. Engels, "it was almost impossible now to wage major offensive wars and it soon became impossible to even give major offensive engagements. The degeneration of the troops forced the state to limit itself to the defensive which initially had an offensive nature, but later became more and more passive...."[8]

The process of decay and decline in slaveholding relationships was accompanied by an increased struggle by the slaves for their liberation and by more frequent revolts. The strongest in the history of Ancient Rome was the revolt led by Spartacus in 73-71 B.C. This shook the entire Roman Empire to its foundation. Spartacus succeeded in creating a battleworthy rebel army numbering more than 100,000 men and to win a number of remarkable victories over the slaveholder armies. Being by nature an able organizer and talented military leader, he quickly shifted his troops, he made surprise strikes against the enemy and routed it piecemeal. Spartacus perished courageously in battle. V. I. Lenin called him "one of the most outstanding heroes of one of the largest slave revolts...."[9]

In the slaveholding states, a strategy of defensive wars was also developed along with offensive strategy. Initially, the defensive had a passive nature as the weakest side, in being subjected to attack by superior enemy forces, avoided field engagements, it sheltered its troops in fortresses and, relying on them, resisted. However, experience showed that even when the attacker did not have seige engines, the fortresses were

not saved from defeat, as ultimately they surrendered after an extended seige. Only such strongholds as Babylon and Tyre could hold out for a long time. But after the appearance of seige engines they also fell. Because of this, a passive defensive began to develop into an active one.



Diagram 2. The Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.)

Key: 1--Roman possessions at start of war; 2--Possessions of Carthage at start of war; 3--Direction of Roman campaign; 4--Campaign of Hannibal up to battle at Cannae and his return to Africa; 5--Campaign of Hasdrubal into Italy; 6--Campaigns of Carthaginians after battle at Cannae; 7--Sites and years of major engagements won by Carthaginians; 8--By Romans; 9--Cities beseiged and taken; 10--By Carthaginians; 11--By Romans; 12--Territories conquered by Rome as a result of the war.

The so-called "little war" was one of the types of active strategic defensive. Its essence was that the defending troops, in being attacked by superior enemy forces, instead of seeking shelter in fortresses, split up their forces into small detachments. In taking refuge in mountainous and forested areas, these detachments by frequent raids alarmed and impeded the advance of the enemy, it checked and blocked its path, it destroyed individual formations and garrisons and deprived it of food and feed. With the approach of large enemy forces, these were not engaged, but rather they again retreated into the mountains or forests. Classic examples of a "little war" were provided by the peoples of Bactria (modern Afghanistan) and Sogdiana (present-day Central Asia) in their conquest initially by Persian troops and then by Alexander the Great. By a "little war"

the Parthians forced the Romans in 117 A.D. to evacuate the western possessions of Parthia (Mesopotamia).

Nomadic peoples (Scythians, Massagetae, Saxons and others), after an invasion by a stronger enemy, retreated deep into their territory, organizing continuous attacks by cavalry detachments on the enemy, thereby wearing the enemy down, and then, when it was finally exhausted and weakened, they went over to a counteroffensive and won a victory. The first to employ such a strategic defense were the Black Sea Scythians during the invasion of the Persians in 512 B.C.

One should also note the question of the methods of military control and command in the described era. Thus, in the period of early slaveholding, there was a collective form of leadership over the armed forces and the alternating of troop command during a war by the military leaders (strategos or consuls). However, a war demanded a unity of thought and will and this was possible only with one-man command. Hence over time the armed forces began to be led by kings or emperors. They, as a rule, were in direct command of the armies during the period of wars. But all the major decisions were taken by military councils consisting of the most prominent military chiefs and, as a rule, the monarchs did not act contrary to the council's decision. With an increase in the size of the armed forces and the greater scope of wars, troop command in secondary theaters was entrusted to individual military leaders. In this instance, they were given only a general task while the methods of carrying it out were determined by them.

Thus, the development of strategy in the wars of slaveholding society occurred from simple raids for the sake of plundering neighboring countries and peoples to planned campaigns for the conquering of these nations in the aim of enslavement and exploitation, from the achieving of victory over the enemy by just the force of weapons alone to the use of all factors of a military, political, economic, moral and diplomatic nature.

The functions of strategy in the wars of antiquity were: the organizational development of the armed forces; organizing the defenses of frontiers; equipping the theater of military operations in road and material terms; complete reconnaissance of the enemy (its armed forces, economic and moral capabilities); the planning of the war and the preparation of the armed forces for it; the choice of the area of the main thrust; leadership over the armed forces in the course of the war. The latter came down to determining the methods for achieving victory over the enemy, to supplying the troops with everything necessary for life and combat, to holding on to captured territory and to carrying out maneuvers and moves in the aim of obtaining favorable conditions to defeat the enemy.

Even in the wars of early slaveholding states, military strategy not only stemmed from policy, but also was closely intertwined with it. For this reason, the talented military leaders were simultaneously prominent state figures and diplomats.

A study of military strategy in a slaveholding society provides an opportunity to disclose and comprehend objective patterns which determine the methods of conducting combat operations and a war as a whole on the basis of the existing methods of production and to more profoundly understand the very important Marxist thesis that the weapons of an army and a navy, their "composition, organization, tactics and strategy depend primarily upon the degree of production achieved at the given moment and upon the means of communications."[10]

FOOTNOTES

1. The history of slaveholding society is divided into three periods: the period of early slaveholding states (the middle of the 5th millenium B.C. until the beginning of the 6th Century B.C.) including Sumer, Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Urartu, Persia and others; the period of the flourishing of slaveholding (the 6th Century B.C. to the middle of the 2d Century A.D.) with Ancient Greece and Rome where slaveholding relationships achieved greatest development; the period of decay and fall of slaveholding relations (the middle of the 2d Century until the 5th Century A.D.) with the Roman Empire.

2. "Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. Biografiya" [Vladimir Il'ich Lenin. A Biography], 4th Edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 505.

3. Hannibal, Annibal Barca (247 or 246-183 B.C.)—a state and military leader of Carthage, one of the major generals of the Ancient World. A characteristic feature of his strategy was that he was able to correctly assess the military-political situation on the eve of the war and utilize contradictions in the enemy camp, as well as ensure the stability of the lines of communications and supply depots. Widely known is his outstanding victory over the Romans at Cannae (216 B.C.).

4. "Istoriya diplomatii" [The History of Diplomacy], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1959, p 69.

5. "Suvorov v soobshcheniyakh professorov Nikolayevskoy akademii General'nogo shtaba" [Suvorov in the Papers of the Professors of the Nikolae Academy of the General Staff], Vol 1, St. Petersburg, 1900, p 7.

6. Napoleon, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Voyenizdat, 1956, p 680.

7. A "corvus" was a boarding ramp with a hook on the tip which caught on the deck or side of an enemy vessel and helped its capture by armed troops.

8. K. Marks and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 19, p 466.

9. V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 77.

10. K. Marks and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 20, p 171.

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BOOK ON SOVIET DIPLOMACY PRIOR TO GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 26 Nov 82) pp 81-82

[Review by F. Petrov under the heading "Criticism and Bibliography" of the book "Pered velikim ispytaniyem" (Before the Great Trial) by P. P. Sevost'yanov, Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, 368 pages]

[Text] The book by P. P. Sevost'yanov entitled "Before the Great Trial" is devoted to the foreign policy activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet government in the complex international situation of the first period of World War II. It covers the time from September 1939 through June 1941. Using extensive material from Soviet and foreign sources as well as archival documents, the author has disclosed USSR policy vis-a-vis the German Nazi imperialist grouping and has shown the struggle to ensure security and strengthen the nation's defense capability in line with the preparations for the forthcoming crucial clash with German Naziism.

The book correcly points out that Soviet diplomacy on the eve of World War II steadily unmasked the provocative actions in the diplomacy of the Axis states headed by Hitler Germany which justified the militaristic course of their governments by the "threat of communism." In providing a proper rebuff to these intrigues, the USSR repeatedly made specific proposals to carry out collective measures to check aggression and eliminate the danger of a new world war, the threat of which was becoming evermore apparent. However, the Western powers did not want to heed the voice of reason and rejected all the concrete measures proposed by the USSR in the League of Nations to eliminate the threat of a new world war. This inspired the leadership of Nazi Germany to the outright use of military force. In 1936, Germany reoccupied the demilitarized Rhineland, in 1938, Austria, and in 1939, Czechoslovakia. World War II had become inevitable.

On 17 April 1939, the USSR undertook a new and last attempt to prevent the approaching war, having proposed the creation of an anti-Nazi coalition based upon a military-political pact for mutual aid between the USSR, England and France. This would be based on the principle of equal rights and obligations for all participants. But the Western powers again would not agree. Now the Nazis, the most reactionary and aggressive forces of the imperialist bourgeoisie, found their hands freed. They drew mankind into a new world war. This could have been prevented. Such a viewpoint is shared by many Western scholars and statesmen. Thus, in presenting to Parliament the decisions of the Crimean [Yalta] Conference for the leaders of the three Allied powers of the USSR, the United

States and Great Britain, the English Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Eden, in February 1945 stated: "Could anyone now doubt that if the uinity established in Yalta between Russia, Britain and the United States had occurred in 1939, this war would never have broken out" (p 24).

The author soundly refutes the conjectures by bourgeois falsifiers about a certain "agreement" between the USSR and Germany aimed against the Western powers as well as the absurdities about Soviet trade and economic aid to Germany in the course of the war against England and France. At present, many previously unavailable documents of the English and French governments have become public and these show the true state of affairs. Thus, in a secret report drawn up in January 1940 by the Planning Subcommittee for the English Joint Chiefs of Staff and reviewed in the same month by the English government, it was pointed out that over the first 3 months of the war, oil imports by Germany were around 523,000 tons. Oil deliveries from the USSR did not exceed 9,000 tons. In other words, less than 2 percent of the German imports (p 41).

In order to justify the treacherous attack on the USSR, bourgeois historians have concocted a legend about a "preventive war." They assert that the Nazis began the war against the USSR in the aim of preventing Soviet aggression against Germany and other nations of the Western world. The reviewed work gives weighty facts which reveal the baselessness of this legend. On 22 July 1940, Hitler ordered operational planning started for an attack on the USSR. Some 10 days later at an enlarged meeting for the leadership of the German armed forces, the strategic goals, the overall plan of the war and the preliminary dates for starting it were established. "...Russia should be liquidated. The date is the spring of 1941." In speaking about the German preparations for war against the USSR, the English historian A. Bullock has emphasized that in Hitler's attack on Russia "there was nothing at all that was improvised." "Of all his decisions, this was the earliest taken and the most carefully prepared" (pp 320-321).

The activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet government in 1939-1941 were aimed at preventing the involvement of the nation in the war and to gain time for strengthening international positions and reinforcing the defense capability of the Soviet state. This was the purpose of the measures to increase the might of the Armed Forces and to strengthen the Western frontiers.

In the book basic attention is focused on those questions of Soviet foreign policy in the initial period of World War II and which have not been sufficiently examined by Soviet scholars. On the basis of new archival documents, P. P. Sevost'yanov recreates the picture of events in those alarming days and shows the unceasing tense duel between the USSR and Germany.

Of significant interest is the analysis of Soviet policy vis-a-vis England, France and the United States. The book for the first time in a generalized form describes the anti-Soviet trends in the policy of these states and it also examines the particular features of its "duality" vis-a-vis the USSR and the contradictoriness of the attempts to "reinsure themselves" and not to permit things to reach an extreme conflict with our nation, although objectively the anti-Soviet activities of England, France and the United States were pushing events precisely in this direction.

Also valid are the author's conclusions that precisely the purposeful actions of the USSR were the basic factor which prevented the consolidation of the imperialist camp on an anti-Soviet basis in 1939-1941.

The work of P. P. Sevost'yanov is a definite contribution to carrying out the timely practical tasks of the present-day ideological struggle. The material contained in it will enrich Soviet historians and other workers on the ideological front with new data essential for unmasking the fabrications of bourgeois historiography. It makes it possible to show the complete baselessness of the various false historical "analogies" presently being constructed in the West and aimed at reinforcing the bourgeois propaganda myth about the "Soviet threat."

The book is also not devoid of certain shortcomings. Its order can scarcely be considered successful. In the first chapter entitled "Historical Reality and Its Falsification," the author speaks in rather great detail about Soviet relations with Germany. Then in the special seventh chapter entitled "Relations of the Soviet Union with Germany and Italy," he repeats what has already been said. There are also repetitions in the description of German policy vis-a-vis Turkey and Iran. The author repeatedly returns to this question.

In our view, the problem of Soviet relations with China has been sparsely treated. Basically this came down to economic aid by our nation to the Eastern neighbor. But certainly many Soviet pilots fought in the Chinese skies against the Japanese militarists and specialists from the Red Army trained men from the other branches of troops in the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

As a whole, though, the book merits a positive assessment.

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CSO: 8144/0656

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Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 12, Dec 82 (signed to press 26 Nov 82) pp 90-92

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April 8, 1983